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Title of Dissertation: Attributional Style and Sleep Disturbance in 
Combat Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Marian Bova 
Psy.D., May 5, 2004 
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine 
Bruce S. Zahn, Dissertation Advisor 
This study investigated attributional style, i.e., locus of control, stability, and globality, 
as well as other causes of sleep disturbance in combat veterans with posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). The causes of sleep disturbance which were studied included 
restlessness/agitation, mental overactivity, consequences of poor sleep, and lack of sleep 
readiness. A case-control group design (N = 100) compared combat veterans who had 
PTSD (n :::;: 50) with a group of similar-aged men who did not have PTSD (n 50). SPSS 
10.0 was used to conduct all analyses. MANOV As (a. .05) were used to analyze results. 
Findings suggested that combat veterans with PTSD have a pessimistic attributional style 
for hypothesized bad events that is internal, stable, and global. Combat veterans had 
vi 
significantly stronger stable and global attributes, as well as more restlessness, agitation and 
mental overactivity that they identified as interfering with sleep. Combat veterans had 
considerably less concern about the consequences of poor sleep. Groups did not differ on 
lack of sleep readiness. Results suggested that routine clinical treatment might include 
attributional retraining to modifY combat veterans' pessimistic attributional style and 
cognitive restructuring to lower the mental anxiety associated with restlessness, agitation, 
and mental overactivity. 
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ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE AND SLEEP DISTURBANCE 
IN COMBAT VETERANS WITH POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
Individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) often complain of serious and 
persistent sleep complaints (Hurwitz, Mahowald, Kuskowski, & Engdahl, 1998; Engdahl, 
Eberly, Hurwitz, Mahowald, & Blake, 2000) long after the traumatic incidents have 
occurred. Sleep disturbance, called the hallmark ofPTSD (Hurwitz et aI., 1998; Engdahl et 
aI., 2000; Ross, Ball, Sullivan, & CaroH: 1989; Meichenbaum, 1994; Chokroverty, 2000; 
Morin, 1993), remains poorly understood, possibly because the multifactorial etiology of 
sleep makes categorizing insomnia difficult and makes finding its underlying causes essential 
and challenging. In this manuscript, the words "insomnia," "sleep disturbance," "sleep 
difficulties," and "sleep problems" are used interchangeably. 
Supporting literature demonstrated the fact that patients with PTSD complain of sleep 
onset~ maintenance, and restorative sleep problems; however, quantitative findings from 
polysomnographic (pSG) reports (Engdahl et aI., 2000; Hurwitz et al., 1998) in sleep 
laboratories have been inconsistent and contradictory with patients' qualitative reports. 
These studies suggested that objective sleep was notably better than expected, considering 
the chronicity of se1f-reported sleep difficulties in combat veterans with PTSD. No 
significant sleep disorder or typical pattern of sleep disturbance was detectable by PSG that 
would explain or potentiate patients' symptoms of insomnia. The most compelling 
observations appeared to be that sleep is intact in novel situations (sleep laboratory) for 
individuals with histories of serious and persistent sleep complaints. 
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Available data (Marchini, Coates, Magistad, & Waldum, 1993) indicated that thoughts, 
in genera~ distinguish between good and poor sleepers, but there has been little systematic 
study into the nature of thoughts that people have about sleep (Fichten et al" 1995), 
Research tended to focus primarily on the objective aspects of the sleep disruption, In 
evaluating predisposing circumstances for insomnia, qualitative cognitive factors (Smith, 
Perlis, Carmody, Smith, & Giles 2001; Walters, Adams, Binks, & Vemado, 1993; Tait, 
1992; Healey et at., 1981) have infrequently been considered, even though there is evidence 
that these may be features in insomnia, 
Purpose of the Study 
Researchers in the field of sleep medicine (Krakow, Johnson et al" 2001 Krakow, 
Melendrez et at, 2002; Ballenger et ai" 2000) call for additional cognitive and behavioral 
studies investigating PTSD and insomnia. This study answered this call by investigating 
whether or not insomnia, secondary to PTSD, is similar in presentation to insomnia without 
PTSD, in attributional style and in beliefs about the perceived causes of insomnia. 
Overall, there appears to be a lack of information about the treatment and effectiveness 
in settings of routine clinical care that specifically assesses and addresses sleep disturbance 
in the veteran population with PTSD, The nature of combat veterans' attributional styles 
and beliefs as causes of sleep problems appeared underrepresented in the research on sleep 
disturbances. Yet, there has been increasing emphasis in the insomnia literature 
demonstrating that cognitive models of treatment may be efficacious in the treatment of 
chronic insomnia, Combat veterans with PTSD, as well as others with chronic sleep 
problems, may benefit from evidenced-based cognitive behavior therapies for nightmares 
and insomnia (Krakow, Johnson et aI., 2001). 
It has been suggested (Krakowet aI., 2000; Nowell et aI., 1997) that the reason sleep 
disturbance with combat veterans has received insufficient study is because it is considered 
secondary to PTSD. Specific studies that target subjective sleep disturbance andPTSD is 
severely limited; this is true as well for all secondary insomnias (Krakow, Johnson et aI., 
2001). However, the lack of research on insomnia and PTSD patients is perplexing because 
insomnia, nightmares, and PTSD have been successfully treated with cognitive behavior 
therapies, yielding long-tenn improvements in nightmare frequency, sleep quality, and 
psychiatric distress (Krakow, Kellner, Pathak, & Lambert, 1995). Sedating medications, 
(Kupfer, 1999) and psychotherapy in general, improve insomnia (Berlin, 1985), although 
neither approach specifically targets the dynamics that maintain insomnia. When veterans 
are asked if their sleep medication or previous psychotherapy has improved their sleep, they 
almost universally say that sleep is the one symptom that has not improved. 
The intent and purpose of this study was to identify cognitive-behavioral variables of 
attributional style and beliefs about the causes sleep problems, with the assumption that 
these variables may have a role in the maintenance of sleep disturbance. Such identification 
may assist in producing some information necessary to develop sleep-specific treatment 
programs that might bring balance to the positive and negative aspects of daily life. 
Favorable balance is characteristic of people who identify themselves as "good sleepers" 
(Fichten et al., 1995). 
Attributional style and perceived causes of sleep disturbance appear to be significant 
components of insomnia. It has been suggested (Mikulincer & Solomon, 1988) that 
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veterans with PTSD demonstrate a pessimistic attributional style for both good and bad 
events. In general, a pessimistic attributional style for good events is considered external, 
unstable, and specific, whereas, an optimistic attributional style for bad events is considered 
internal, unstable, and specific (Craig & Curryhead, 1990; Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 
1988; Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Johnson et aI., 2001; Joseph, 1999; Alloy, 
Abramson, Metalsky, & Hartlage, 1988; Alloy, Kelly, Mineka, & Clements, 1990). It seems 
reasonable to assume that sleep may be considered a "good event," and insomnia may be 
considered a "bad event." A complete discussion of attributional style can be found in the 
theoretical section of this manuscript. 
Because sleep has a multifactorial etiology, it would be essential to know the perceived 
causes of sleep disturbance prior to the development of treatment programs. Gathering 
infoonation on perceived physiological arousal, stimulus controls, mental alertness 
associated with beliefs about control, consequences of sleep, and sleep readiness will 
collectively suggest which mctors are correlated with PTSD. Investigation of these factors 
may guide the tailoring of cognitive-behavioral treatment for future outcome trials with 
veterans having PTSD who identifY problems with sleep. 
Hypotheses 
It is hypothesized that cognitive aspects of insomnia, not measurable by 
polysomnography (pSG), may be important features in the maintenance of chronic 
insomnia. It has been previously suggested that long-teon sleep disturbance is related to 
maladaptive attributional style (Van Egeren et aI., 1983; Fichten et al., 1995) and cognitive 
distortions about the causes and consequences of sleeplessness (Espie, Inglis, & Harvey, 
2001), albeit the original cause of insomnia in combat veterans may have been adaptive to 
survival in a war zone. More specifically, this study investigated whether or not combat 
veterans with PTSD and sleep disturbance endorse a pessimistic attributional style for bad 
events and whether or not their perception of sleep difficulty is associated with 
restlessness/agitation, mental overactivity (cognitive hyperarousal), ~nsequences of 
insomnia, and lack of sleep readiness. Restlessness, agitation, and mental overactivity are all 
associated with mental anxiety. 
If combat veterans attribute bad events to external causes, they assume denial of 
personal responsibility, the common denominator of all external attributions. Consequently, 
it is possible that veterans with PTSD shy away from accepting responsibility for bad events 
because the disorder involves a generalized loss of personal control. Therefore, it may be 
possible that a pessimistic attributional style in sleep-disordered veterans is correlated with 
insomnia. The following hypotheses were investigated in relation to attributional style for 
bad events: 
Hl: Combat veterans with PTSD group locus of control will be statistically different 
from a comparison group of men without PTSD, and combat veterans locus of control will 
be external. 
H2: Combat veterans with PTSD group will more strongly attribute events to stable 
causes than a comparison group of men without PTSD. 
H3: Combat veterans with PTSD group will more strongly attribute events to global 
causes than a comparison group of men without PTSD. 
Concomitantly, Espie and colleagues (2001) found that elements of perceived 
physiological arousal, combined with poor stimulus control, were important factors in 
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insomnia in the general population of poor sleepers. Other identified factors were related to 
mental alertness, endorsing beliefs about the need for control, perceived consequences of 
both daytime and nighttime behavior, and sleep readiness behavior. The current study 
hypothesized that the cognitive variables identified by Espie et at. will be endorsed by 
combat veterans but to a statistically greater degree than insomnia in the general population. 
The specific hypotheses for this study for the perceived causes and consequences of sleep 
disturbance are as follows: 
ffi: Combat veterans with PTSD group will report statistically more restlessness and 
agitation than a comparison group of men without PTSD. 
lis: Combat veterans with PTSD group will report statistically more mental 
overactivity than a comparison group of men without PTSD. 
H6: Perceived consequences of sleep will not be statistically different between the 
combat veterans with PTSD group and a comparison group of men without PTSD. 
H7: Lack of sleep readiness will not be statistically different between the combat 
veterans with PTSD group and a comparison group of men without PTSD. 
Theoretical Background 
Cognitive theory was chosen for the current study because it has proven efficacy for 
ameliorating insomnia and PTSD, and such approaches have consistently produced 
significant and long-lasting improvements in patients' self-reported sleep pattern (pallesen, 
Nordhus, Havik, & Nielsen, 2001; Morin, Culvert, & Swartz, 1994; Murtagh & 
Greenwood, 1995; Borkovec, Grayson, O'Brien, & Weerts, 1979; Morin, 1993; Morin et 
ai., 1999; Sharpe, Hoagland, Greenblatt, Giles, & Perlis, 2000; Perlis et at., 2000; Blake & 
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Hurtado Gomez, 1998), even among psychiatric patients (Nowell et aI., 1997~ Dashevsky & 
Kramer, 1998). Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) also has been well documented with 
proven efficacy with PTSD (yule, Williams, & Joseph, 1999; Krakow et al., 2001; Kellner, 
Neidhardt, Krakow, & Pathak, 1992; Krakowet aI., 1995, 1996; Neidhardt, Krakow, 
Kellner, & Pathak, 1992; Kupfer, 1999; Krakowet aI., 2000; Weaver, Resnick, Glynn, & 
Foy, 1999; Ballenger et aI., 2000; Harvey, Inglis, & Espie, 2002; Espie et aI., 2001). In the 
sleep research field, CBT is often referred to as one of the "nonpharmacological 
interventions" or "alternative therapies," for insomnia. This all-encompassing tenn 
comprises ail therapies other than psychopharmacological treatments for insomnia (Langer, 
Mendelson, & Richardson et aI., 1999). 
CBT is a set of therapy systems that uses a broad range of cognitive and behavioral 
techniques to affect change in mood, thought, and action. The theory of CBT shares the 
assumptions that dysfunctional thinking contributes to the maintenance, and perhaps to the 
initial onset of psychopathology. The focus of CBT is on the alleviation of current problems 
and symptoms by attending to patients' capacities for constructing a wide range of 
idiosyncratic and self-defeating meanings of their experiences (Haaga, Rabois, & Brody, 
1999; Freeman & Oster, 1999). CBT is far more direct, active, short-term, collaborative, 
and educative than humanistic and psychodynamic therapies because it helps patients learn 
cognitive conceptualizations of their symptoms and ways in which such symptoms might be 
managed. 
The major therapeutic focus in the CBT model is to help patients systematically 
examine and identifY the manner in which they construe and understand the world and to 
experiment with ways of responding in order to influence emotion, behavior, and physical 
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symptoms. By learning to understand idiosyncratic ways in which patients perceive the self, 
experience, world, and future, patients can alter negative affect and behave more adaptively 
(Freeman & Oster, 1999). The goal ofCBT is not to replace cognitive distortions, but to 
help develop skills to question and to chaUenge the distortions. CBT aims to change 
symptom attribution and to improve outcomes in the treatment of persistent and troubling 
symptoms because patients are actively involved in testing out and modifYing their 
dysfunctional beliefs about their symptoms (price, 2000). Clinicians who use CBT guide 
patients to reexamine the validity of their beliefs and to reframe them with more adaptive 
substitutes, thus short-circuiting the self-fulfilling nature of the maladaptive cognitions 
(Morin, 1993; Pallesen et al., 2001). Studies which employ objective PSG measurements 
have also demonstrated a reduced time in falling asleep and staying asleep when following 
the implementation of behavioral interventions, even though the effects are smaller when 
compared with subjective measures (Morin, Colecchi, Stone, Sood, & Brink et al., 1999). 
Clinicians working with patients suffering from insomnia cannot overlook patients' 
thoughts, fears, and expectations in the cognitive realm. These cognitive factors, which have 
a direct impact on the individual's ability to sleep (Chambers, 1992; Van Egeren et al., 
1983), can also affect patients' cooperation with the treatment program. The clinicians' 
understanding of patients' attributional style and cognitive distortions about sleep may be 
closely related to the ultimate success of the therapeutic approach in the reduction of sleep 
deficits in the combat veteran population. 
Alternately, the complaint may focus on distressing nighttime experiences and worry 
about the consequences of poor sleep. Fichten et al. (1995) demonstrated the facts that both 
state and trait anxiety, especially the cognitive aspects, are associated with concerns about 
the sleep problem. This notion suggested that a focus on managing the anxiety might best 
treat high distress related to poor sleep. The characteristics of non-complaining poor 
sleepers also highlight the importance of what Kendall (1984) called the "power of 
nonnegative thinking." In essence, successful coping with psychophysiological changes 
associated with aging is closely related to the absence of psychological maladjustment. 
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Many ways exist to reduce or eliminate negative or dysfunctional cognitions. One 
obvious means is through replacement with positive cognitions whereby people increase the 
frequency of positive appraisals, thoughts, and images that may make the experience of 
disrupted sleep less aversive (Morin, 1993; Morin, Stone, Trinkle, Mercer, & Remsberg, 
1993). Cognitive strategies involve systematic therapeutic examination ofthe individual's 
attributions of predictability, controllability, and culpability about the traumatic experience 
and their relationship to current life assumptions. 
A criticism ofCBT research is that incomplete characterization of the heterogeneity of 
insomnia makes experimental design difficult (Rauri, 1981). As it is likely that multiple 
factors playa role, effective evaluation of therapy will require that patients be prospectively 
characterized and assigned to the appropriate type of therapy. To the extent this is already 
possible, specific cognitive-behavioral therapies can be made more effective by using them 
with patients with the appropriate type of insomnia (Hauri). Second, studies of the efficacy 
of CBT with insomnia require that there first be a consensus identification of the relevant 
outcome variables (Langer et aI., 1999). Because insomnia is a symptom, arguably; the only 
relevant outcome measure is alleviation of the complaint. Under these conditions, subjective 
outcome measures might be the most important index of successful treatment. 
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Alternatively, a public health perspective might dictate that the important outcome 
measures are improvement in objectively quantified nocturnal sleep, daytime 
alertness/performance, and long-term medical and psychiatric health. Although the 
evaluation of pharmacological therapy has proceeded in this direction with emphasis on 
daytime measures (Stepanski, 1994), there remain very few such studies of CBT with PTSD 
and insomnia. In some cases, the two measures of successful treatment may be in conflict. 
In successful sleep restriction therapy, for example, the restriction of time in bed and the 
increased sleep efficiency do alleviate the complaint of disturbed sleep, but do not increase 
total sleep time, suggesting that daytime alertness will not be improved (Spielman, Saskin, 
& Thorpy, 1987). Despite these obstacles, formal evaluations ofthe efficacy ofCBT 
approaches have been performed. The results are mixed. However, Stepanski (1994) found 
that, as a group, appropriately controlled studies of the efficacy ofCBT measures suggested 
an advantage over a placebo in subjective outcome measures, but there is no such 
advantage in a limited number of studies using objective (pSG) outcome measures. Meta-
analyses (Morin et aI., 1994; Murtagh & Greenwood, 1995) have come to similar 
conclusions by identifying significant improvements in subjectively assessed nocturnal sleep 
relative to placebo treatments. 
Supportive Evidence for CBT and Insomnia 
Research has suggested (Espie et aI., 2001; Perlis et al., 2000; Milby et aI., 1993; 
Langer et al., 1999; Harvey et al., 2002; Edinger, Hoelscher, Marsh, Lipper, & Ionescu-
Pioggia, 1992; Morin, Kowatch, Barry, & Walton et aI., 1993; Morin, Stone et aI., 1993; 
Reidel, Lichstein, & Dwyer, 1995; Riedel & Lichstein, 1998; Fichten et aI., 1995) that CBT 
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is an effective treatment for persistent insomnia. Encouraging results indicated substantial 
normalization of sleep patterns after six weekly CBT sessions that consisted of 
psychoeducation on sleep information, sleep hygiene practices, and sleep scheduling 
(stimulus control, sleep restriction, relaxation therapy). Of the 109 participants in the study 
(Espie et al., 2001), two thirds of patients achieved and maintained a sleep latency of fewer 
than or equal to 30 minutes one year after completion of therapy, and a similar proportion 
achieved fewer than or equal to 30 minutes of wakefulness during the night. A high 
percentage of participants had sleep patterns after CBT that were similar to normal 
controls.(Espie et al.) also suggested that tendency for higher levels of anxiety or depressive 
symptomatology was associated with better responding, particularly in terms of nighttime 
wakefulness. In other words, those with relatively higher symptom levels responded to CBT 
by achieving greater continuity in their sleep. Results from this study provide corroborating 
evidence that CBT may be effective for chronic insomnia in veterans whose attributions are 
pervasively stable and global. Because a substantial body of psychological research has 
yielded important evidence about the genesis of maintenance of insomnia, models ofCBT 
have emerged and have been used as a treatment approach, primarily to alter maladaptive 
cognitions that typically perpetuate insomnia (Spielman, 1986). 
In a clinical case series study (perlis et al., 2000), 47 patients (mean age 39.2) with 
primary insomnia were evaluated. Results showed that patients improved an average of 
43%. This average corresponded to a 65% reduction in sleep latency, a 46% decrease in 
number of awakenings per night, a 48% reduction in wake time after sleep onset, and a 13% 
increase in total sleep time. The results also suggested that CBT treatment for insomnia is as 
effective in clinical settings as it is under clinical trial conditions. 
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Comparisons between CBT and pharmacological therapy are few, and those available 
rely largely on subjective indices of nocturnal sleep quality. These studies suggested (Langer 
et al., 1999) that the benefit obtained by pharmacological treatment is immediate but is not 
sustained beyond cessation of therapy; however, the benefit ofCBT approaches is delayed, 
but persists beyond the completion of therapy. There is evidence that provided the support 
for a combined approach with early pharmacological therapy that can be withdrawn when 
CBT approaches become effective (Milby et aI., 1993). 
Cognitive strategies appeared to contribute to improved sleep outcome (Harveyet al., 
2002). Cognitive restructuring had some impact upon intermittent wakefulness rather than 
on initial insomnia. This is consistent with the results for other wakefulness measures in 
which better preparation for bed, both mentally using cognitive control and behaviorally by 
following a pre-bed routine, was modestly predictive of response. It seemed possible that 
continuity of sleep is facilitated by the development and maintenance of adaptive beliefs and 
attitudes. It has been tentatively suggested by Harvey et ai. that CBT, which prioritizes the 
adoption of sleep scheduling and cognitive restructuring, may be more likely to produce 
clinically meaningful results than more the broad, educational approaches that emphasize 
sleep hygiene, relaxation, or thought blocking methods. 
Empirical investigation with CBT and insomnia involving older adults indicated that 
CBT specifically addressed factors that sustain sleep maintenance complaints (Edinger et 
aI., 1992; Morin, Kowatch et al.; 1993; Morin, Stone et al., 1993; Riedel et al., 1995; Riedel 
& Lichstein, 1998; Lichstein, 2000) and improved quantitative sleep variables and 
qualitative sleep ratings. Participants reported an increased sense of control over their sleep 
and improved daytime functioning after CBT; it was also effective for decreasing wake-
after-sleep onset to nonnative levels. CBT for late life insomnia was also effective in 
reducing sleep latency, in early morning awakening, and in increasing sleep efficiency 
(Morin, 1993). The above studies differed somewhat in defining the minimum age of older 
adults. The most common minimum age defining late-life insomnia was 55; the minimum 
age was 59 in the Riedel and Lichstein (1998) study, and 60 in the Morin, Kowatch et al. 
(1993) study. 
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Fichten et al. (1995) substantiated some of the widely held, but poorly documented, 
assumptions about sleep and lifestyle in aging individuals (mean age in sample 1 was 70 and 
sample 2 was 68). Results suggested that the highly distressed, poor sleepers' scores 
reflected an anxious, depressed, worrying and negative cognitive-affective set. Additional 
findings suggested (Fichten et aI., 1995) that in all areas of behavioral medicine, the 
physiological, behavioral, cognitive, and affective dimensions must be taken into account 
when evaluating the experience of insomnia. Data suggested that the insomnia complaint is 
itself multifaceted; therefore, specific aspects of the sleep problem must be assessed by 
therapy. The manner in which sleep disruption is expressed or interpreted may need to be 
addressed. 
Empirical Support for CBT and Secondary Insomnia 
As mentioned earlier, insomnia is a frequent complaint among patients with comorbid 
anxiety or affective disorders. Although a benefit of CBT has been well documented for 
primary insomnia, little infonnation exists on CBT for secondary insomnia. However, 
Vallieres, Bastein, Ouellet, and Morin (2000) investigated the efficacy ofCBT for sleep 
difficulties in anxious and depressive patients. They also studied whether or not the use of 
medication for these disorders influences the outcome of insomnia treatment. Findings 
suggested that CBT is effective for alleviating sleep difficulties among patients with 
comorbid anxiety or depression disorders. In addition, insomnia treatment reduced 
depressive and anxiety symptoms. Thus, the presence of anxiety or depressive conditions, 
and the use of psychotropic medications for those conditions, did not seem to alter the 
effectiveness of CBT for insomnia. 
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It is generally assumed that treatment of predominant conditions, for example, anxiety 
or depression, will decrease or even eliminate the symptoms of secondary conditions, such 
as insomnia. Preliminary findings have shown that sleep difficulties improved following 
treatment of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), although participants did not necessarily 
meet the diagnostic criteria of chronic insomnia at pretreatment. Blais, Mimeault, and Morin 
(2000), who assessed the effect of CBT for insomnia on GAD symptoms and vise-versa 
among patients suffering from comorbid insomnia and GAD, empirically examined this 
assumption. Results suggested that treatment targeting both sleep and anxiety symptoms 
produced clinically significant improvements on both types of symptomatology among 
patients suffering from a comorbid insomnia and GAD. Therapeutic gains were better 
maintained when treatment focused first on GAD symptoms. Additional research is needed 
to replicate the study findings and to evaluate other methods (sequential versus concurrent) 
. for implementing multi-focused treatments for insomnia associated with comorbid 
psychopathology. 
The efficacy of multi-modal cognitive-behavioral intervention for women with 
nonmetastatic breast cancer was studied in relation to sleep disturbance (Quesnel, Savard, 
Simard, Ivers, & Morin, 2003). Results revealed significant improvements of sleep 
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efficiency and total wake time. Results of this study were corroborated by PSG data. The 
researchers found that insomnia treatment was associated with significant improvements of 
mood, general and physical fatigue, and global and cognitive dimensions of quality of life. 
Findings of this study suggested that CBT, previously found effective for primary insomnia, 
is also of clinical benefit for insomnia secondary to cancer. 
Investigations done with insomnia secondary to chronic pain (Currie, Wilson, 
Pontefiact, & deLaplante, 2000; Smith et aI., 2001), as mentioned earlier, suggested that 
participants were significantly more improved than control participants on self-report 
measures of sleep onset latency, sleep efficiency, and sleep quality, showing less motor 
activity in ambulatory recordings of nocturnal movement after CTB treatment. At a three-
month follow-up assessment, treated participants showed good maintenance of most 
therapeutic gains. These results suggest that CBT is an effective treatment strategy for 
secondary insomnia, and specifically for chronically painful medical conditions. 
A small (n = 62), uncontrolled study (Krakow et aI., 2001) offered sleep treatment to 
crime victims with PTSD who suffered from nightmares and insomnia. Interventions 
included imagery rehearsal for nightmares (rehearsing images of a changed nightmare), 
sleep hygiene (instruction on sleep habits and behaviors), stimulus control (eliminating 
learned sleep~preventing associations), and sleep restriction (increasing sleep quality and 
efficiency by reducing time spent in bed) therapies, along with cognitive restructuring to 
assist patients in identifYing beliefs and behaviors that hamper attempts to sleep. Imagery 
rehearsal used for treatment of nightmares is a cognitive imagery approach (Krakow et ai., 
2001; Kellner, et al., 1992; Krakowet aI., 1995; Krakow et aI., 1996) that encourages the 
user to change the nightmare (Neidhardt et al., 1992), and then rehearse the "new drea.nr' 
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while awake. Imagery rehearsal used by Krakow et al. (2001) did not distinguish between 
traumatic and non-traumatic nightmares, albeit participants were encouraged to select less 
intense, non-trauma related disturbing dreams after learning the technique. Cognitive 
restructuring was also used because PTSD patients usually link nightmares and trauma 
inextricably (Johnson et al., 2000), thus setting up a barrier to change. Accordingly, patients 
were encouraged not to discount past trauma, but instead to consider that "nightmares that 
are trauma-induced may become habit-sustained" (Krakow et aI., 2001, p. 2044). Patients 
were taught how to manage unpleasant imagery that might develop while they were 
practicing imagery or during imagery of "new dreams." Results demonstrated moderate to 
large improvements, equivalent to changes in clinical severity from severe to moderate, in 
nightmare frequency, insomnia, and psychiatric distress after receiving treatment. 
Attributional Theory 
From a cognitive perspective, stress and coping emphasize the process of stimulus 
appraisal (Lazarus, 1966, 1991). There appears to be considerable agreement that appraisal 
processes are central to understanding the etiology ofPTSD (Joseph, 1999), and the best 
aspect of appraisal is the concept of causal attribution. 
Seligman (1975) argued that the root of poor psychological adjustment was the 
development of a general belief that one was helpless in controlling or preventing negative 
outcomes from occurring. Seligman's model was revised and refonnulated into the theory 
ofleamed helplessness (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) that subsequently 
attracted a great deal of attention (Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 1988; Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Johnson et aI., 2001; Joseph, 1999; Alloy, Abramson, Metalsky, 
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et aI., 1988; Alloy et al., 1990) in the investigation of casual attribution. The reformulated 
model of learned helplessness posited the idea that negative causal attributions were linked 
to psychological adjustment in adults. In turn, holding a negative attributional style was 
believed to place individuals at greater risk for psychological morbidity than for those who 
did not make such attributions. 
Abramson et a1. (1978) added the trait concept ofattributional style to personality 
characteristics and defined it as a tendency to make some particular kinds of causal 
inference, rather than other kinds, across different situations and across time. Explanatory 
or attributional style is a cognitive personality variable that reflects how individuals explain 
bad events that happen to them (peterson & Seligman, 1984). According to the attributional 
theory, people usually ask themselves the causes the events they experience. People often 
seek to explain outcomes and events in their environment, especially those events that are 
novel, important, or unexpected (Weiner, 1979, 1985, 1986). The causal attributions 
(explanations) generated by this search process directly impact subsequent cognitions, 
emotions, and behaviors. 
The reformulated theory ofleamed helplessness proposed by Abramson et al. (1978) 
was later revised (Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 1988; Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 
1988; Alloy et al., 1990) to the hopelessness theory. The essence of the hopelessness theory 
is that stable (the perception of the cause of the event(s) is long lasting) and global (the 
perception of the cause of the event(s) affects a wide range of life domains) causal 
attributions for a negative event are liable to lead to an expectation of hopelessness. In other 
words, it is expected that highly aversive situations are liable to recur and no response can 
change the likelihood of this outcome~ such expectations tend to include a mixture of 
anxious and depressive phenomena. (Alloy et at, 1990). 
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The taxonomy for classifYing attributions covers dimensions of locus of control, 
stability, and globality (Weiner, 1979, 1985, 1986; Mikulincer & Solomon, 1988~ Abramson 
et al., 1978). Locus of control is either internal or external. It is sometimes called the 
"internality" dimension. Internal causes are personal characteristics related to ability or 
aptitude. External or outside-of-the-person causes are environmental factors that are related 
to chance. The location of a cause on the controllability dimension indicates the extent to 
which a cause is perceived as subject to personal control or as subject to factors that are 
outside the control of the person. The stability dimension describes whether or not causal 
attributions are steadfast. Stable attributions, such as personality characteristics, are 
consistent over time. Unstable attributions are more likely to change with time or with some 
amount of effort. Globality determines whether or not the course is specific to a situation or 
generalized and pervasive to others areas. Theseattributional dimensions have the potential 
to significantly alter a person's beliefs and subsequent behavior associated with a particular 
event or outcome (Weiner, 1985). Attributional style has been conceptualized (Craig & 
Curryhead, 1990) as being either pessimistic (internal, stable, and global for negative events 
and external, unstable, and specific for positive events) or optimistic (internal, stable and 
global for positive events and external, unstable and specific for negative events). 
Attributional Style and Depression 
Investigation into the cognitive theories of depression has sought to answer the 
question about certain individuals' vulnerability to depression when faced with life's 
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stressors. It is theorized that attributional investigation with depression is relevant to this 
study because of the high comorbidity of depression and PTSD (Kulka et aI., 1990; 
Ballenger et al., 2000). According to the attributional vulnerability component of the 
hopelessness and reformulated helplessness theories of depression (Abramson et al., 1989; 
Abramson et aI., 1978; Alloyet al., 1999), individuals who tend to attribute negative events 
to internal (something about the self), stable (enduring), and global (general) causes are 
experience onset of depression or a worsening of current depression when confronted with 
stressors than are individuals who do not exhibit this depressogenic attributional style 
(Johnson & Miller, 1990). In Beck's (1967) cognitive model of depression, negative self-
schemata organized around themes of failure, inadequacy, loss, and worthlessness Serve as 
risk factors for the onset and exacerbation of depression that are activated by the 
occurrence of stressful life events. Such negative self-schemata are often represented as a 
set of dysfunctional attitudes or self-worth contingencies in which the person believes that 
his or her happiness and self-worth depend on being perfect or on others' approval. 
Consistent with cognitive science and social-cognition perspective on the operation of 
self-schemata, it was hypothesized (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Beck, 
1967) that depressive self-schemata influence the perception, interpretation, and memory of 
personally relevant in a negatively biased construal of one's personal world. When activated 
by the occurrence of stressful life events, depressive self-schemata leads to the onset or 
exacerbation of depressive symptoms through their effort on preferential encoding and 
retrieval of negative self-referent information (Reilly-Harrington, Alloy, Fresco, & 
Whitehouse, 1999). 
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Numerous studies (Abramson et aI., 1989; Anderson, 1999; Peterson & Seligman, 
1984; Peterson et aI., 1982; Reilly-Harrington & Alloy, 1999; Reilly-Harrington et aI., 
1999; Alloy et aI., 1988; Abramson, Alloy & Metalsky, 1995; Alloy, Abramson et aI., 1999; 
Spasojevi-Cacute & Alloy, 2001; Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, & Pickering, 1998) have found 
that a negative and self-defeating attributional style is associated significantly with 
depressive symptoms. However, most evidence for the relationship between attributional 
style and depressive symptoms is correlational (Joseph, 1999; Sweeney, Anderson, & 
Bailey, 1986). 
The role of cognitive processes in the phenomenology, onset, course, and treatment of 
unipolor depression has been the subject of fruitful scientific investigation over the past two 
decades (Reilly-Harrington & Alloy, 1999; Reilly-Harrington, Alloy et at., 1999). Both 
Beck's (1967) theory and the hopelessness theory (Abramson et aI., 1989; Alloyet aI., 
1988) are cognitive vulnerability-stress models of depression that view maladaptive 
cognitive patterns as wlnerabilities that heighten the risk both for becoming depressed and 
for experiencing increased severity and duration of depression when confronted with 
stressful life events. Whereas such theories have expanded our knowledge of unipolar 
depression (Abramson et aI., 1995; Alloy et at, 1999) expansions by others (Reilly-
Harrington & Alloy, 1999; Reilly-Harrington et aI., 1999) have contributed to the 
understanding of cognitive processes in bipolar mood disorders. Cognitive-behavioral 
interventions aimed at modifYing maladaptive cognitive styles and decreasing the impact of 
environmental stressors that are effective for depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 
1979), may be useful as adjunctive treatments not only for unipolor and bipolar depression 
but also for sleep disturbance in people with PTSD. Pathology, such as depression, is most 
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likely to be experienced by individuals with high personal standards and a self-critical 
attributional style (Flett et al., 1998). High personal standards lead to consistent failure, 
which suggests the link between perfectionism and depressive experiences. Consequently, 
the impact of failure should be significantly greater for individuals who blame themselves for 
their failures (Ferguson & Rodway, 1994). 
Likewise, researchers (Spasojevi-Cacute & Alloy, 2001) discovered that patients who 
ruminate (i.e., repetitively focusing on one's symptoms and on the causes, meanings, and 
consequences) in an attempt to cope with and manage their depressive moods paradoxically 
worsen rather than alleviate their conditions. Despite the fact of the ineffectiveness and even 
the dire consequences of persistently using rumination to attempt to regulate one's 
depressive moods, some individuals repeatedly engage in it. Spasojevi-Cacute and Alloy 
lend support for the theory that preventive and therapeutic efforts should focus on 
rumination directly, a phenomenon that appears to be a variable in the sleep disturbance of 
patients with PTSD. CBT therapies that teach skills for engaging in benign distracting 
activities to control depressed mood have the potential to weaken one's tendency toward 
repeatedly engaging in passive depressive symptoms. The investigations by Spasojevi-
CaCtite and Alloy have contributed to the knowledge that the presence of a strong negative 
attributional style may be involved in determining the severity; as well as the course of the 
depressive experience. 
Attributional Theory and PTSD 
Attributional processes are central to understanding how survivors react to extreme 
events, such as those leading to PTSD. There may be conflicting tension between the need 
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to maintain self-esteem and the need to perceive the world as controllable. It has been 
suggested (Joseph, 1999) that these needs drive attributional processes. The hopelessness 
theory is able to encompass a range of psychological reactions commonly observed in 
trauma survivors, and perceptions of stability and globality are important attributional 
dimensions that predict the development of an expectation of hopelessness. The 
hopelessness theory has been applied to a wide variety of illnesses and injuries (De Vellis & 
Blalock, 1992); and although the hopelessness theory does not make explicit predictions 
regarding PTSD, it has been suggested (Foa, Zinbarg, & Rothman, 1992) that 
controllability and predictability regarding the traumatic event(s) may playa central role in 
the understanding ofPTSD. Hopelessness, along with perceptions of helplessness and 
powerlessness, are common themes expressed by survivors of traumatic events (Harvey et 
aI., 1995; Joseph, Williams, & Yule, 1993). Expectation of hopelessness is a theme echoed 
throughout Janoff-Bulman's (1985, 1992) theory of shattered assumptions. For example, 
many of the beliefs that survivors develop following traumatic event(s) suggest the 
cognitive schemata of the randomness and the malevolence of the world that bad things will 
continue to happen on a wide-scale basis (Janoff-Bullman, 1979). 
Weiner (1979, 1985, 1986) proposed various attributional dimensions that may be 
associated with PTSD. The attribution of good events to uncontrollable, external, and 
unstable causes (pessimistic attributional style), and bad events to uncontrollable, internal, 
and stable causes may be important features ofPTSD (pessimistic attributional style). The 
attribution of events to uncontrollable causes has been found to lead to reduced 
involvement with the external world, and this detachment is featured as a diagnostic 
criterion ofPTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Although numerous factors 
may be related to post war adjustment, Weiner's theory suggested that the way combat 
stress casualties explain the occurrence of good and bad events plays a role (Mikulincer & 
Solomon, 1988). There is an intriguing association between the way people attribute causes 
to events (attributional style) and their psychological adjustment following trauma. 
However, even ifposttraumatic attributional style is a function of the event(s), its role 
in predicting future psychological adjustment remains of much interest. Attributional style is 
concerned with subjective perceptions of hypothesized future events. The distinction has 
been made (Frazier & Schauben, 1994) between control over the past and control over the 
future. Perhaps it may be more useful to help survivors gain control over future events 
rather than to focus on the adaptiveness of various attributions about the cause of the event. 
The perception of control over future events might be hypothesized as one important 
determinant of adaptive coping activity (Joseph, 1999). Consequently, a particular type of 
attributional style might be helpful when considered in one context but might be harmful in 
another. 
In conceptualizing the role of subjective perceptions of hypothetical future events, it is 
further necessary to distinguish between positive and negative outcomes. Theorists (Joseph, 
1999) have emphasized the role of pessimistic attributional style for negative events as a 
possible vulnerability factor in relation to actual negative events; it has also been suggested 
that an optimistic attributional style for positive events might be important in determining 
how people respond to stress (Craig & Curryhead, 1990). This might be due to its influence 
on coping behavior (Solomon, Mukulincer, & Avitzur, 1988) and the seeking of social 
support (Joseph, Williams et aI., 1993). 
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Furthennore, much of the symptomatology for which the hopelessness theory was 
developed are common to the survivors of traumatic events (Brewin, Joseph, & Kuyken, 
1993; McFarlane & Papay, 1992) and are included in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) for PTSD, categories C and D: C4, markedly diminished interest or 
participation in significant activities; C5, feelings of detachment or estrangement from 
others; C6, restricted affect; C7, sense offoreshortened future; Dl, difficulty in falling or 
staying asleep; D2, irritability or outbursts of anger, and; D3, difficulty concentrating. Thus, 
there is clear symptom overlap between depression and PTSD (Joseph, 1999). Hopelessness 
theory would therefore be able to account for at least some aspects ofPTSD. Of course, 
trauma survivors experience a wide range of other emotional and behavioral reactions that 
\ may be accounted for by other attributional processes such as self-blame (internality) and 
other-blame (externality). 
When relationships between causal attributions and symptomatology ofPTSD in 
female victims of crime Were investigated (Falsetti & Resick, 1995), results had several 
implications regarding theory, treatment, and research with female crime victims. Although 
there was some support for the differences in attributions of victims and non-victims, the 
results did not follow the clear distinctions put forth by the reformulated learned 
helplessness theory (Abramson et aI., 1978). Results indicated that internal, stable 
attributions for negative hypothetical events were associated with depression, but no 
support was found for an association of global attributions and depression. It was 
speculated that the reformulated learned helplessness theory alone does not fully account 
for depression or for PTSD in victims of crime. Although there appeared to be a 
relationship between these diagnoses and causal attributions, the hypothesized clear 
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attributional differences on the dimension of stability, internality, globaUty, and 
controllability were not found. It should be noted that types of attributions might vary, 
depending on the diagnoses and type of event. For instance, for those victims who suffer 
from depressio~ external and unstable attributions fur positive events may need to be 
addressed. In addition, those attributions typically thought to be associated with learned 
helplessness (internal, stable, uncontrollable attributions for negative hypothetical events) 
may also playa role in depression. On the other hand, for victims who suffer from PTSD, 
cognitive intervention may need to focus on internal, stable, and uncontrollable attributions 
surrounding the victimization event, as well as unstable attributions for positive events. 
With female crime victims, it appeared that attributions associated with PTSD are more 
circumscribed than are those associated with depression. Overall, the relationship between 
causal attributions and type of symptomatology is a complex one. 
Additional investigation between causal attributions and PTSD (Joseph, Hodgkinson, 
Yule, & Williams, 1993) in civilian survivors ofa shipping disaster indicated that the more 
internal and controllable the causal attributions, the higher the subsequent levels of 
depression, anxiety, and intrusive thinking. A replication study of this shipping disaster was 
done (Joseph, Brewio, Yule, & Wtlliams, 1993) with adolescents who survived the Jupiter 
cruise ship disaster. Results in this study clearly indicated causal attributions were 
overwhelmingly uncontrollable. Results confirmed that in adolescents, the more attributions 
that were made to internal causes, the higher the subsequent level of intrusive thinking and 
depressive symptoms. Both of these studies have emphasized the possible maladaptive role 
of self-attributions. However, it is currently unknown if the results would extend to other 
situations which would include combat veterans with PTSD. 
I 
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It is speculated that the most powerful determinant of causal attribution is likely to be 
the nature of the event itself, and people have relatively stable ways of explaining events 
(Bums & SeligtruUl, 1989). According to the helplessness theory (Abramson et al., 1988; 
Abramson et aI., 1989; Alloy, et aI., 1988), the types of causal attributions that are actually 
made following negative events constitute a vulnerability factor for the development of 
PTSD. For example, one person might construe an event as a lucky escape from which he 
or she has benefited in some way, whereas another might construe the same event as a 
catastrophic misfortune, which has left him or her feeling that life is meaningless (Joseph, 
Williams et aI., 1993). It might be expected that the emotional reactions of these two people 
will reflect these different appraisals. Appraisal is very much an idiosyncratic process, which 
does not lend itself easily to empirical study. 
The reason that the constructs of uncontrollability and unpredictability are important 
rests on the general theoretical viewpoint that people have a need to predict the future, to 
control events, and to operate on a day-to-day basis as if the world were predictable and 
controllable (Joseph, 1999~ Harvey & Weary, 1985). The consequence of this is that people 
who are exposed to uncontrollable and unpredictable events are strongly motivated to 
understand why the event(s) occurred (Weiner, 1986) in an attempt to re-establish 
perceptions of the world as predictable and controllable (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Evidence 
(Craig, Hancock, & Dickson, 1994) shows that perceptions of being out of control are 
predictive of poorer adjustment. 
As well as the need for perceived predictability and controllability, people also have a 
need for self-esteem, and will attempt to enhance and maintain their self-esteem through 
their understanding of why events in their lives occurred (Steele, 1988; Brewin, 1988). Self-
esteem, like perceptions of predictability and controllability, is thought to serve a stress-
buffering function (Greenberg et ai., 1993). Causal attribution is the central cognitive 
mechanism involved in the attempt not only to establish and maintain self-esteem, but also 
to perceive the world as predictable and controllable. 
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Research on combat veterans following the 1982 Lebanon War (Mikulincer & 
Solomon, 1988) demonstrated the fact that attributions for real-life bad events tend to be 
external and not internal, as proposed by Weiner (1979, 1985). Discrepancies between the 
external attributional styles for bad events and internal style proposed by Weiner indicated 
the need for further investigation on attributional style and PTSD. Results of the current 
study may provide additional evidence to advance an understanding of this difference. The 
attribution of good events to uncontrollable, external, and unstable causes and bad events to 
uncontrollable, internal, and stable causes may be associated with important features of 
PTSD and may be associated with chronic sleep disturbance in the combat veteran 
population. External attribution for events haS been found to wear down self-esteem 
(Metal sky, Abramson, Seligman, Semmel & Peterson, 1982) and low self-esteem may be a 
significant feature among PTSD veterans (Weiner, 1985). The attribution of good events to 
unstable causes and bad events to stable causes has been shown to promote depressive 
cognitions (peterson & Seligman, 1984), another associated feature ofPTSD. 
In 1988, Mikulincer and Solomon examined the relationship between attributions for 
good and bad events and combat-related PTSD. The researchers sampled 262 Israeli 
soldiers who suffered a combat stress episode during the 1982 Lebanon War, following 
them two to three years after their participation in combat. The cross-sectional analyses of 
their study revealed a significant relationship between attributions and PTSD at the two 
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points of assessment. Changes in PTSD from Time 1 to Time 2 were also associated with 
changes in attribution. Mikulincer and Solomon demonstrated the fact that there is a 
significant relationship between attribution for both good and bad events and post,:,combat 
psychopathology. Increases in PTSD intensity, psychiatric symptomatology, and problems 
in social functioning were an found to be associated with (a) attribution of good events to 
more external and uncontrollable causes, and (b) attribution of bad events to more external, 
stable, and uncontrollable causes. Among the attributions for bad events, the researchers 
found that the dimension of controllability is the most important correlate of combat-related 
psychopathology, The importance of this may be in the fact that attribution of events to 
uncontrollable causes is associated with low motivation, low functioning, and feelings of 
helplessness (Maier & Seligman, 1976; Weiner, 1985). Among PTSD patients, the 
attribution of events to uncontrollable causes might be directly related to low interest in 
enjoyable activities (and this may include sleep), a defining characteristic ofPTSD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
As for the attribution of good events, the externality dimension was the primary 
correlate of combat-related psychopathology. PTSD subjects (Mikulincer & Solomon, 
1988) saw successes as being caused by external factors, as being unrelated to skill, 
motivation, and efficacy. Their attributional pattern may be reflective of their entrapment in 
a vicious circle oflow self-esteem (Weiner, 1985). People with low self-esteem generally 
think that they lack some element crucial for succeeding in life, and attribute whatever 
successes they have to external factors. This rejection of personal credit for success, in turn, 
perpetuates low self-esteem by preventing positive experiences from enhancing their sense 
of efficacy. Veterans who suffer from PTSD tend to have low self~esteem, which might be 
associated with the attribution of success to external factors. 
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Although low self-esteem may encourage attribution of good events to external causes, 
the finding that PTSD veterans also attribute bad events to external causes suggests that 
low self-esteem in and of itself cannot explain the entire attributional style ofPTSD. 
Previous research has found that people with low self-esteem tend to blame themselves for 
their problems (peterson & Seligman, 1984; Weiner, 1985), and low self-esteemed PTSD 
veterans should not be exceptions. Yet there seems to be a more important factor in 
determining the attributional style associated with combat-related PTSD-denial of 
personal responsibility, which is the common denominator of all external attributions. It is 
possible that veterans with PTSD shy away from accepting any responsibility for good or 
bad events because the syndrome might involve a generalized, perceived loss of personal 
control over environmental events. This assumption may have important clinical 
implications. If patients with PTSD tend to deny personal responsibly for good and bad 
events, they would differ markedly from depressives. Like the PTSD veterans, depressed 
patients have been found to attribute good events to external causes (peterson & Seligman). 
The fact that both PTSD and depressed patients reject responsibility for good events creates 
a similar difficulty in the therapy of both groups because recovery from a psychological 
disorder is a good event (Mikulincer & Solomon, 1988). It is, therefore, possible that both 
groups might be passive in their therapy and wait for recovery to come from outside. 
Efficacious treatment ofPTSD, however, is associated with the patient taking responsibility 
for the progress of therapy (Milgram, 1986). 
Whereas depressed patients make internal attributions for bad events, PTSD subjects 
make external causal attributions, rejecting all blame (Mikulincer & Solomon, 1988). If 
further investigation provides results consistent with this observation, it may indicate that 
veterans with PTSD may not be trapped in the depressive paradox of blaming themselves 
for uncontrollable events (Abramson & Sackeim, 1977). Research has shown that greater 
external locus of control is associated with less adequate adjustment in combat veterans 
(Solomon & Mikulincer, 1987), which suggests that an optimistic attributional style for 
positive outcomes is associated with better psychological adjustment. 
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Results from Mikulincer and Solomon's (1988) attributional styles· study that was 
described earlier suggested that deterioration of mental health is associated with 
maladaptive attributional patterns. There may be a circular relation in which PTSD and 
maladaptive attributional styles intensifY each other. Following this reasoning, it appears 
logical that if the original attributional pattern was adaptive, reversal of the pattern may 
subsequently be an appropriate therapeutic approach to facilitating recovery from the 
insomnia reported by combat veterans with PTSD. Because PTSD was present in subjects 
before studies, findings cannot test causality regarding the significant relationship that was 
found between attribution and PTSD. Conclusions that PTSD causes individuals to attribute 
events in a self-defeating way are no less tenable than the conclusions that attributional style 
contributes to PTSD. A mutually reinforcing relationship between attribution and PTSD 
might be expected. However, more needs to be learned about the association between 
attributions and PTSD. 
Iflocus of control were a determinant ofPTSD, the strength of the association would 
seem to be moderated by the intensity of exposure (Joseph, 1999). Although association 
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was found (Solomon, Mikulincer, & Benbenishty, 1989) between locus of control and 
trauma-related distress with soldiers who had experienced low battle intensity, no 
association was found for those soldiers who had experienced high battle intensity. They 
suggest that the moderating effect of battle intensity was due to its informational value in 
helping the soldier explain his behavior to himself High-intensity battle, they argue, leads 
the soldier to explain his combat stress reaction entirely by the stressful events, whereas low 
intensity battle leads to explanations affected by locus of control. This study proposes to 
investigate veterans with moderate to high combat exposure and the results may provide 
additional evidence to support this premise. 
Attributional variables are a rich source of ideas because growing evidence suggests 
that attributional processes are involved in the development and maintenance ofPTSD. 
Consequently, attributional theory promises to be useful in the treatment ofPTSD (Joseph, 
1999) and may provide considerable data for developing individualized treatment for 
alleviating distress in chronic sleep disturbance that follows exposure to traumatic events. 
Attention focused on changing cognitions about the Cause of past event(s), and most 
definitely about future event( s) may reduce perceptions and reduce the severity of sleep 
disturbances in combat veterans. Causal attributions do not necessarily retIect realistic 
perceptions of events, and the role of therapy, it has been argued, should aim to encourage 
realistic attributions in the patient (Joseph, 1999; Fosterling, 1988). Further research in 
attributional style ofPTSD patients with sleep disturbance will most likely be fruitful in 
providing insight into the nature of cognitive struggles that survivors are engaged in as they 
attempt to come to terms with their experiences and get a good night's sleep. 
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Attributional Theory and Insomnia 
Two studies (Van Egeren et al., 1983; Fichten et al., 1995) have specifically 
investigated relationships among attributions, cognitions, and insomnia. Van Egeren's et al. 
(1983) exploratory study was the first systematic evaluation of the relationship among 
attributions, cognitions, and sleep problems. Results indicated that the content of pre-sleep 
cognitions was significantly related to laboratory-measured subjective sleep-onset latency, 
general sleep problem concerns, and the degree of discrepancy between subjective and 
objective measures of sleep onset. Attributions of sleep-onset difficulties were significantly 
related to interview-reported subjective sleep-onset latency, general sleep problem 
concerns, and pre-sleep concern about initiating sleep. Cognitive variables were not 
significantly associated with objective measure of sleep-onset latency. Results from this 
study suggested one explanation about the discrepancy between subjective measures of 
sleep disturbance and the PSG reports (Engdahl et al., 2000; Hurwitz et at, 1998) of 
Vietnam veterans. To this end, Fichten and colleagues (1999) investigated not only sleep 
parameters and the accompanying thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, but also various indices 
oflifestyle and daytime activities. They postulated the idea that other aspects, most 
specifically state and trait anxiety, contribute to poor sleepers' complaints both about the 
magnitude of the sleep problem and about their daytime experience offatigue and 
sleepiness. 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Reactions of soldiers in times of war have led to the most significant advances about 
the effects oflife~threatening traumatic stressors on psychological adjustment (Yule et aI., 
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1999). Military personnel, who were faced with high casualty rates during World War I, 
often had psychological reactions on the battlefield. In the early 1900s, "shell shock" was 
the favored tenn for reactions to stress that had previously been tenned "nervous shock," 
"traumatic neurosis," "anxiety neurosis," or "fright neurosis," Each description was built on 
a previous one and reflected the understanding of the day. At first, shell shock was 
conceived solely in physical tenns-a shock that caused damage to the physical nervous 
system (Yule et al.). It soon became evident that some people developed similar symptoms 
without having experienced a shell explode near them. Such soldiers were often accused of 
cowardice; some were executed if they refused to fight. 
Horowitz (1975; 1976) and Horowitz, Wooer, and Alvarez (1979) appeared to be the 
first researchers to study the phenomenology of trauma-related reactions. Frameworks for 
research utilized concepts from the psychodynamic and information-processing theories. 
The researchers observed traumatized individuals who were initially assailed by intrusive 
and emotionally disturbing memories; they subsequently used avoidant strategies to ward 
off distressing thoughts, images, and feelings. They "worked through" the reactions in 
alternating phases of intrusion and avoidance. The work of Horowitz greatly influenced the 
American Psychiatric Association (1980) that recognized the syndrome ofPTSD in the third 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o/Mental Disorders. The syndrome 
acknowledged that, following traumatic events, some people developed symptoms of an 
intrusive re-experiencing of the trauma (including recurrent and distressing dreams), 
avoidant behaviors, and symptoms of increased physiological arousal (including difficulty 
faIling or staying asleep). 
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The Vietnam Conflict and its horrendous aftermath was another phenomenon that 
brought to the attention of mental health professionals the devastating effects that the war 
experience had on military personnel. In some ways, one of the legacies of that Conflict has 
been the recognition of the syndrome ofPTSD through work undertaken at Veteran 
Administration hospitals that gathered not only evidence of the acute and chronic residuals 
of war exposure, but also the enduring effects on personality and adjustment (yule, 1999; 
Yule et aI., 1999). Following war, emotional balance was restored in some combat 
personnel, but profound and prolonged psychological sequelae in the form ofPTSD ensued 
in other combat personnel (Yule et aI., 1999; MikuIincer & Solomon, 1988). For those 
whose balance was not restored, PTSD tends to run a chronic course with progressive 
modification over time (McFarlane, 2000). 
After a slow beginning, other mental health professionals began to recognize similar 
constellations of symptoms among civilians exposed to acute stressors, realizing that all 
human beings are complex organisms who constantly strive to adapt to the demands placed 
on them by their physical and social environments (Yule et at, 1999). Stress and fear are 
natural reactions when faced with a threatening situation. Initially this response served as a 
survival function. However, once the danger has passed, the characteristics can persist as a 
way of recognizing and avoiding signs of danger in the future. 
The development ofPTSD differs from other anxiety disorders because its onset must 
follow exposure to a traumatic event or series of events with direct personal experience that 
involves either actual or threatened death, or serious injury, or the witnessing of such events 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The current behavior of sufferers from PTSD is 
psychologically organized around, and dominated by, the traumatic experience(s). Essential 
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features in the diagnostic criteria forPTSD are (1) persistent re-experiencing of distressing 
thoughts and feelings associated with the trauma, including recurrent nightmares and 
dreams~ (2) persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and a numbing of 
general responsiveness; and (3) persistent symptoms of increased arousal, including 
difficulty falling or staying asleep. Reminders of the event stimulate extreme anxiety and 
recurrent re-experiencing of the trauma; these intrusive thoughts and flashbacks are core 
features ofPTSD. 
Prevalence of PTSD 
In the general population, PTSD is one of the most common anxiety disorders,with a 
lifetime prevalence rate on the order of 5% to 10% (Ballenger et al., 2000). Prevalence 
rates vary across surveys according to differences in the population samples, assessment, 
and diagnostic criteria used to define the disorder. Although prevalence estimates are 
lacking in populations in the developing world, PTSD is expected to be greater in the many 
countries where there is increased and continued exposure to traumatic events, such as in 
war-tom countries with interpersonal violence. 
PTSD and depression head the list of common mental disorders in terms of disability to 
the individual and financial burden to society (Ballenger et al., 2000). PTSD is more 
strongly associated with suicidal behavior than are other anxiety disorders, more notably 
than panic disorder which many clinicians perceive to be as important as depression in 
promoting suicidality. In fact, taking the most significant marker for extreme distress-
suicide attempts-the rate of attempted suicide by persons who have PTSD has been 
reported at 19"10 (Rendin & Haas, 1991~ Ballenger et al., 2000), comparable to the rate 
reported among those who have depression. 
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Retrospective epidemiological studies have found war veterans from Vietnam have 
lifetime PTSD prevalence ranging from 15% to 30%, with minority and women veterans 
having slightly higher percentages (Kulka et al., 1990; Foa, 2000; Sivak & Swenson, 2000). 
This data suggests combat veterans with PTSD may have a chronic course of the disorder, 
despite treatment. However, other factors such as pre-existing conditions, comorbidity, the 
recency exposure to trauma, compensation-seeking behavior, and small sample size of 
research studies may confound results PSTD studies (Engdahl et at., 2000). 
Predictive Factors of PTSD 
PTSD is a multifaceted disorder that can be influenced by pre-event factors, event 
factors, and post-event factors (Meichenbaum, 1994) related to the individual, as well as 
factors related to the trauma (Ballenger et al., 2000). Although the disorder ofPTSD can 
develop in individuals without any predisposing conditions, particularly if the stressor is 
especially extreme (depending on severity, duration, and proximity of exposure), a number 
of predisposing factors have been implicated as increasing the risk ofwlnerability. In 
general, premorbid risk factors become less important as the intensity of the stressor 
experience increases. 
Specific traumas differ in the level of stress induced and the likelihood of producing 
PTSD. Important predictive factors include the involvement of interpersonal violence, 
severity of the trauma, chronicity of the traumatic experience, and whether or not the 
recovery environment is associated with secondary stressors, such as pain, relocation, job 
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loss, or blame (Ballenger et al., 2000). There is a high degree of correlation between the 
level of danger perceived by the individual exposed to the trauma and the likelihood of 
developing PTSD (Ballenger et al.). Previous exposure to trauma and a personal or family 
history of psychiatric disorders, particularly depressive disorder, are all predictors ofPTSD 
related to the individual (Meichenbaum, 1994; Ballenger et aI., 2000). 
However, PTSD is more liable to occur in individuals who have had previous exposure 
to traumatic stressors, or who have had pre-trauma adjustment problems. Yet, some 
traumatic pre-stress experiences may not generate PTSD symptoms, nor increase their 
severity. For example, soldiers surviving previous battles without psychological sequelae 
decrease their risk for stress reactions after a second combat experience (Solomon, 
Mikulincer, & Jakob, 1987). A history of combat stress reactions, however, increases the 
likelihood ofPTSD in the future. 
The reason some individuals develop PTSD after traumatic experiences is most likely 
related to vulnerability and protective factors from the acute stress response that come into 
play during the transitional stage. (Ballenger et aI., 2000). In this critical phase, the acute 
stress reaction will stabilize in some individuals and progressively dysregulate in others. It 
could be argued that risk factors for psyChiatric disorders in general are operating during 
this phase to determine the pattern of dysregulation that leads to PTSD or other conditions. 
Prior victimization such as childhood abuse (Zaidi & Foy, 1994) can be considered a 
premorbid factor for soldiers exposed to battle. Furthermore, soldiers who experienced 
poor adjustment prior to military service, tended also to have the highest combat exposure. 
This information supported an interactional model of pre-military, combat, and post-military 
experiences, cumulatively putting soldiers at risk (Elder & Clipp, 1989). Other premorbid 
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factors associated with the development ofPTSD (Meichenbaum, 1994) are a history of 
psychiatric disturbance (namely, anxiety and depression) prior to the trauma, developmental 
and family instability, early substance abuse, absence of social supports, and the ageat 
which the traumatic event(s) occurred. For example, soldiers who were less than 20 years 
old and who served in Vietnam were more vulnerable than their older colleagues 
(Meichenbaum) because the time of the trauma overlapped with Erikson's intimacy versus 
isolation psychosocial stage of development (Sroufe, Cooper, & DeHart, 1996). The 
average age of the Vietnam veteran was 18 during his service in that Conflict. 
Dangerous and unpredictable environments are more likely to invoke trauma; 
therefore, people in these areas have an increased risk of developing PTSD. Examples of 
volatile environments would be locations of natural disasters, areas of high crime, warn-torn 
countries, and locations of terrorist attacks such as those experienced in the United States 
on September 11, 2001 at the World Trade Centers in New York City and the Pentagon in 
Alexandria, Vlfginia. Factors influencing whether or not a traumatic experience will result in 
PTSD can be broadly characterized as factors specifically related to the trauma and factors 
related to the individual. 
Chronicity of PTSD 
Once PTSD has developed, it is often a chronic and recurring condition, generally 
without spontaneous remission, with community studies suggesting that about two thirds of 
people exposed to a traumatic experience will have a normal acute response to stress and 
will not develop any pathologic sequelae (Ballenger et al., 2000). For the remaining one 
third, the principal outcome three months after the traumatic experience is PTSD, either 
alone or in combination with major depression and other anxiety disorders. Previous 
vulnerability to depressive or anxiety disorders will increase the likelihood that PTSD will 
develop after the traumatic experience. 
Exposure to trauma compromises physical health, without regard to whether or not 
PTSD developed after the acute stress response (Ballenger et aI., 2000). One year after 
trauma exposure, victims are more likely to report physical symptoms than people not 
exposed to a traumatic experience. Evidence from studies of combat exposure suggested 
that premature mortality and chronic physical illness are the long-tenn consequences of 
trauma, independent of the victim's meeting full diagnostic criteria for PTSD. 
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The first exposure to a traumatic experience modifies vulnerability, and victims are 
liable to develop clinically significant sequelae to any subsequent exposure to trauma. This 
is particularly true if their response to the first traumatic experience involved a degree of 
dyscontrol or the victim was perceived as a personal failure (Ballenger et al., 2000). People 
with a history ofPTSD commonly experience multiple episodes of the disorder after 
exposure to additional traumas. Given that the average duration of an episode is more than 
seven years, these people will spend a significant proportion of their lives suffering from 
PTSD symptoms. 
PTSD is associated with an increased risk for other anxiety disorders, depression, and 
substance abuse (Ballenger et ai., 2000). The risk of developing secondary comorbid 
disorders is related to the severity of the trauma and consequent complexity of the PTSD 
reaction. Prolonged traumatizations, such as captivity or extensive and repeated experience 
of war may generate pervasive and intractable fonns ofPTSD. 
40 
The challenging question of whether or not the process and nature ofPTSD changes in 
the more chronic fonns of the disorder remains unknown. Kardiner (1941) made an 
interesting comment about chronic traumatic neurosis akin to the notion that some subjects 
undergo a deterioration that is not dissimilar to that which occurs in schizophrenia. He 
theorized that subjects suffer from a kind of delusion, believing that the world becomes an 
unbearably hostile place. The increasing dominance of withdrawal and numbing in chronic 
PTSD has many similarities with the affective blunting and social decline in schizophrenia. 
Although an interesting concept, Kardiner's theoty has received little attention in the more 
recent literature. 
The intensity of the initial reaction to a traumatic experience is an important predictor 
of chronicity. Intense emotional responses are nonnally seen during the first two weeks. 
Sleep disturbance and symptoms of anxiety should improve during this period. However, if 
there was no improvement in the acute stress response at two weeks, treatment for PTSD 
would be recommended (Ballenger et aI., 2000). War zones, obviously, do not permit 
combatants to receive early treatment. Such hostile environments contain secondary 
stressors and additional traumatic experiences. A phenomenon particular to veterans 
returning home from Vietnam was the hostility they encountered when they returned home. 
Such behavior was unprecedented in the United States. For the first time, returning war 
veterans were treated badly by protestors who blamed them for the war, called them 
derogatoty names, and make overtly hostile gestures to them. Additionally, some veterans 
believed that service in Vietnam created a stigma that resulted in employment 
discrimination. 
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Physiology of PTSD 
It is theorized (Nutt, 2000) that PTSD has a biological basis that differs from that of 
depression or from a normal stress reaction. Accumulated evidence has suggested that 
intense psychological trauma could cause long-standing alterations in the neurobiological 
response to stress. Biological dysregulation of the glutamatergic and GABA, amine 
neurotransmitter. and neuroendrocrine pathways probably plays a fundamental part in the 
pathology ofPTSD because of structural and functional changes in the brain. The r-
aminoburtric acid/glutamate system appears to be involved, and there is direct evidence for 
the involvement of serotonin and norepinephrin (Ballenger et al., 2000). The negative 
feedback inhibition of cortisol is heightened in PTSD, such that there is enhanced 
suppression of cortisol in response to low doses of dexamethasone, opposite to that seen in 
depression. Hippocampal volume may also be decreased. The putative circuit for anxiety 
involves the amygdala, hippocampus, cortex, and periaqueductai area (Ballenger, et aI., 
2000; Nutt, 2000; Ballenger, 1998). 
Data is not yet available to specifY the changes that occur in brain pathways in persons 
with PTSD. Further advances in neurobiological techniques will facilitate a more detailed 
understanding of these biological processes. Direct understanding of these biological 
processes may lead to more effective treatment, possibly prevention, ofPTSD (Nutt. 2000). 
A number of outstanding questions remain unanswered about the biological model ofPTSD 
(Ballenger et aI., 2000). Which parts of the putative circuit mediate which symptoms and 
signs ofPTSD? How do treatments alter activity in these circuits? What neurotransmitters 
are involved in mediating the causation ofPTSD symptoms and recovery? How can a 
traumatic event trigger a cascade of neurobiological changes that are seen in PTSD? 
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Phannacological treatment is often used for sufferers ofPTSD. The goals of 
pharmacotherapy are to reduce core PTSD symptoms, reduce disability, improve quality of 
life, improve resilience to stress, and reduce comorbidity (Ballenger et al., 2000). Current 
pharmacotherapeutic options are generally: tricyclic antidepressants (TCA), monoamine 
oxidase inhibitors (MAIOs), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), newer 
antidepressants, anticonvulsants, and benzodiazepines. 
Double-blind research data (International Consensus Group, 1999) support the efficacy 
ofthe TCAs amitriptyline and imipramine. By contrast desipramine is clinically ineffective in 
PTSD, and it is questionable whether or not noradrenergic-specific drugs in general will 
have substantial activity in this condition. Controlled clinical evidence (Ballenger et al., 
2000) demonstrates the efficacy of MAO Is (phenelzine) and promising early studies on 
intervention with nefazodone and anticonvulsants (carbamazepine, sodium valproate, and 
lamotrigine) are documented. Well-controlled data also show the clinical efficacy of the 
SSRIs in PTSD. No studies, however, support the efficacy ofbenzodiazepines in PTSD. On 
the contrary, some evidence (Ballenger el aI., 2000) suggests that the clinical condition of 
patients with PTSD deteriorates when they are treated with benzodiazepines; these include 
impairment of learning in a clinical situation and disturbing withdrawal symptoms. 
Benzodiazepines also potentiate the effects of alcohol (International Consensus Group). 
On the basis of the current level of clinical evidence and from controlled studies under 
review, SSRIs were recommended as the first-line drug therapy for PTSD (Ballenger et al., 
2000; International Consensus Group, 1999). With their spectrum of activity, they are the 
most effective in meeting the defined treatment goals for the condition, in that they reduce 
symptoms and disability, improve functioning and resilience to stress, and treat comorbid 
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depression and anxiety. When patients report sleep disturbance for four consecutive nights 
and an appropriate threshold is established for providing symptomatic relief, a 
nonbenzodiazepine hypnotic is recommended; prescribing benzodiazepines to treat. acute 
sleep disturbance is contraindicated (International Consensus Group). Expert opinions in 
the field (Ballenger et al.) generally support the use of psychotherapy for mild PTSD and a 
combination of drug therapy and psychotherapy for moderate to severe PTSD. 
Nightmares 
Difficulty in falling asleep or in staying asleep is a frequent complaint of veterans with 
chronic PTSD; these problems may be due to nightmares or to other factors. Noteworthy 
differences have been found between those with and those without PTSD in their 
perceptions of sleep quality (Shalev, 2000). Patients with PTSD are extremely aroused 
when they have horrendous nightmares; consequently, the elements of arousal and alarm 
associated with these intrusive phenomena are eventually more important than having the 
thoughts. However sleep researchers studying PTSD (Woodward, Arsenault, Murray, & 
Bliwise, 2000) confront the fact that although trauma-related nightmares (TRN) are the 
most salient and specific sleep disturbance of this disorder, they are not reliably observed in 
the sleep laboratory. Nightmares, as a rule, are rare in the sleep laboratory, even in patients 
with PTSD (Woodward et al., 2000). 
Ntghtmares involving the trauma are one of the defining features ofPTSD, and 
research clearly indicates that patients with PTSD dream about past events (Dow, Kelsoe, 
& Gillin, 1996). What is novel is that even the non-traumatic nightmares (NTRN) of 
patients with PTSD and major depression contain content about past events. Less well 
adjusted survivors of the Holocaust dream significantly more about people from their 
childhood, yet controls and well-adjusted survivors dream more about people from their 
present life (Kaminer & Lavie, 1991). 
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Nightmares appear to promote or exacerbate distress during wakefulness in patients 
with PTSD (Krakow, Germain et al., 2000; Krakow, Hollifield et aI., 2000); Kellner et aI., 
1992; Krakow, Kellner et al., 1995; Krakow, Kellner et al., 1996). Therefore, treating bad 
dreams ought to be associated with a decrease in distress. Distinguishing between TRN and 
NTRN might not be a critical treatment consideration, whereas decreasing nightmare 
frequency, or perhaps nightmare intensity, may ultimately prove to be a core component of 
treatment (Krakow, Johnson et al., 2001). PTSD patients with severe nightmares and 
insomnia may be discouraged by the absence ofa good night's sleep. Therefore, it is 
believed that enhanced sleep, including subjective perception, might provide patients with 
psychological benefits (Kupfer, 1999; Reite, 1998) and physiological restoration (American 
Sleep Disorders Association, 1997), both of which might favorably influence their levels of 
distress. 
Although associations between TRN and combat exposure and the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2; Hathaway & McKinley, 1989) subscale 
scores were not replicated in the sleep laboratory sample, the laboratory sample evidenced a 
familiar pattern of association between nightmare complaints and the Clinician-Administered 
PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blake et aI., 1995) nightmare items (Woodward et al., 2000). The 
MMPI-2 is a broadband psychological test designed to assess a number of major patterns 
of personality and emotional disorders (Hathaway & McKinley). The CAPS is a structural 
clinical interview for assessing core and associated symptoms ofPTSD (Blake et aI., 1995; 
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Blake et aI., 1998). Findings suggested that for PTSD patients, TRNs are distinct from 
NTRN not only in their phenomenology, but also in their associations with memories of 
trauma, with other domains of psychological function, and with sleep behavior. Limited 
laboratory study with combat-related PTSD patients showed that TRN complaint was 
associated with increased wake-after-sleep-onset, whereas NTRN complaint was not. These 
two classes of nightmare complaint did not interact to influence wake time. Understanding 
specific effects of nightmares on rapid eye movement (REM) and non-rapid eye movement 
(NREM) will require, in the area of sleep architecture, further direct PGS observations of 
these events. 
When REM sleep processes and dream content were studied (Vinent & Smith, 2000) in 
women with moderate PTSD, results indicated the dreams had more stressful characters in 
REM sleep relating to traumatic events than did controls. PTSD dreams were more vivid in 
terms of both chromatic and achromatic color and had more descriptive elements, as well. 
Generally, the dreams could be judged to be more vivid than the dreams ofthe controls. 
Recovery from PTSD 
Individuals with PTSD, and even some clinicians, have a low expectation oftreatment 
outcome, with complete remission considered unachievable in many cases. This expectation 
has changed with recent clinical studies of SSRIs and cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT; 
Ballenger et aI., 2000; Yule et aI., 1999). Remission, or freedom from most symptoms, is 
now accepted as a realistic treatment goal in many patients with PTSD, and many others 
will improve substantially with treatment yet retain some symptoms. For the majority of 
patients, however, symptoms such as numbing of affect, irritability, and sleep disturbance 
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will persist. The condition ofPTSD can be resistant to treatment and remain disabling in 
some patients. The need for specific research on the management ofPTSD is clearly echoed 
in the PTSD community of clinicians (International Consensus Group, 1999). More data is 
needed on when treatment should be started and whether or not early intervention has a 
beneficial effect on the long-term outcome ofPTSD. Comparisons are necessary to 
determine the efficacy of drug therapy, cognitive-behavioral therapy, and a combination of 
the two therapeutic approaches, including the sequence in which the two should be 
combined. 
Over the last 10 years, considerable progress has been made in the development and 
validation ofCBT as an effective treatment for PTSD (Weaver et al., 1999); Ballenger et 
aI., 2000; Harvey et aI., 2002). Theory indicates that the focus on the traumatic event is 
what makes CBT techniques specific to the management ofPTSD. CBT offers the most 
promising benefits for relief from many symptoms ofPTSD (Yule et aI., 1999). Most 
treatment packages include the direct exposure therapies and include a selection of anxiety 
management techniques such as relaxation training, breathing retraining, stress inoculation 
therapy, guided self.diaIogue, and cognitive restructuring. The core of successful treatment 
might be in confronting the feared situation (Yule et aI., 1999). Systematic desensitization, 
flooding, prolonged exposure, or implosive therapy has achieved promising results. Detailed 
information on CBT for insomnia and for PTSD is described in the theoretical section of 
this manuscript. 
Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing Therapy (EMDR; Shipiro, 1995) is 
relatively new to the PTSD treatment literature. This intervention was originally 
promulgated as a specific treatment for PTSD, and it has sparked a great deal of interest 
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because very strong claims were made for its efficacy. At present, it appears that some 
people do improve rapidly when asked to recall the traumatic event in images while rapidly 
moving their eyes from side to side. Whether or not this merely acts as a distracter, 
permitting individuals to expose them to the feared situation and allowing habituation to 
occur, is still unclear. Whatever the eventual verdict, it is a rapid treatment method that 
deserves further empirical validation (Yule et al., 1999). 
Costs of PTSD 
Evidence now shows that PTSD compares with depression in the level of disability it 
imposes on individuals with the disorder (Ballenger et al., 2000). Work impairment, as 
measured by the number of workdays lost and work cutback days in the previous month 
(2.8 days), is reported to be the same for PTSD as it is for major depression (Kessler & 
Frank, 1997). More widely, there is evidence that PTSD prevents individuals from realizing 
their potential, either in educational attainment, maniage, or career development. For 
example, the person with PTSD may elect to stay in low-paying employment through fear 
of the stress associated with a more demanding job. 
PTSD is a source of considerable costs to society. Reduced productivity (based on 
workdays lost and work cutback days) translates to a financial loss of more than $3 billion 
annually in the United States, a conservative figure because no account is taken of the 
economic loss associated with the failure of those with PTSD to achieve their education and 
career potential (Ballenger et al., 2000). Social impairment, seen in the failure to establish or 
maintain relationships with partners or in marital breakdowns, imposes a further societal 
burden. This burden is liable to be greater in countries which have not only histories of 
violence, but have also developing social structures and economies. 
Sleep and Sleep Disturbance 
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Human existence seems to be divided into three states: wakefulness, NREM sleep, and 
REM sleep (Chokroverty, 2000), with sleep and wakefulness representing two different 
worlds with independent controls and functions. Fundamental questions about "what is 
sleep?" and "why do we sleep?" are questions that are intriguing and puzzling. For centuries 
the phenomenon of sleep was considered the arena of poets and philosophers, but the 
psychoanalytic revolution brought the issue of sleep (dreams, in particular) into the realm of 
psychology and psychiatry (pressman & Orr, 1997). Descriptions of sleep-related brain-
wave activity were published in the 1930s and 1940s, but it was the relationship between 
dreaming and a specific stage of sleep that catapulted scientific investigation of sleep. 
During the 1960s, burgeoning research in academic departments of psychology and 
psychiatry explored the biological relationship between dreaming, sometimes called the 
"psychosis of sleep," and the distinct physiological entity of REM sleep. Modem sleep 
researchers must deal with a broader scope of problems than in the past. Not only must they 
deal with the traditional problems of patients who have difficulty falling asleep or staying 
asleep, but they must also deal with patients who awaken unrefteshed and feel sleepy during 
the day. Sleep researchers, therefore, must continue to investigate psychological variables 
related to sleep. 
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Sleep Architecture 
Sleep is divided into five stages (Ancoli-Isrea1, 1991; PaIlesen et aI., 2001). The 
amplitude and frequency of brain waves and the presence or absence of eye movement and 
muscle tension characterize each stage. The first of these, Stage 1, is transitional sleep, the 
point when most people find themselves drifting off and realizing they are not fully asleep 
but no longer fully alert. Stage 1 sleep is defined by a decrease in alpha 
electroencephalogram (EEG) activity (1-12 cycles per second) and an increase in theta brain 
waves (4-7 cycles per second). There is high activity in the chin muscle, and there may be 
some slow rolling eye movements. Stage 2 sleep is most often considered the official onset 
of sleep, characterized by sleep spindles (brief periods of activity in the 12-14 cycles per 
second range), with low muscle tension and increased amounts of slow rolling eye 
movements. Stages 3 and 4 are progressively deeper, with Stage 4 being the deepest level 
of sleep. Stages 3 and 4 are sometimes combined and called deep sleep or slow wave sleep. 
Both Stages 3 and 4 are characterized by delta brain waves (1-4 cycles per second). Stage 3 
sleep is scored when delta occupies between 20 and 50010 of a recording epoch 
(Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968). When slow waves make up 50% or more of an epoch, the 
epoch is classified as Stage 4 sleep. Delta activity, the slowest EEG activity to occur during 
sleep, may be the most salient sleep-related EEG. Slow waves, the subset of delta activity of 
interest to sleep specialists, have a frequency of 2 cycles per second or less (Hirshkowitz, 
Moore, & Minhoto, 1997). These four stages of sleep together are called NREM sleep. The 
fifth stage of sleep, REM sleep, is defined by low-voltage. fast frequency EEG and rapid eye 
movements. The electromyogram (EMG) during REM sleep is essentially flat because the 
body is paralyzed during this stage, except for the eyes and respiration. Because 85% of 
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dreams take place during REM sleep, this paralysis is believed to be a protective mechanism 
that keeps us from acting out our dreams (Ancoli-Isreal, 1997). 
Sleep begins in Stage 1 and progresses through Stage 2 to Stages 3 and 4. It then goes 
back through Stage 2 into the first REM period, generally 90-100 minutes after sleep onset. 
One continues to cycle in and out of different stages throughout the night. Most of the deep 
sleep occurs in the first third of the sleep period and most REM sleep occurs in the last third 
of the sleep period. 
Objective Sleep Measures 
Polysomnography (pSG), an objective measure of sleep, means "many sleep writings" 
(Carskadon, 1993). PSG reports consist of all-night recordings usually in a special sleep 
laboratory of the EEG, electrooculogram (EOG), and the EMG. The combination of these 
three channels of information allows the determination oftheditferent levels, or stages, of 
sleep. By reading EEG, EOG, and EMG, a polysomnographer can determine if sleep 
architecture is appropriate, how long each individual spends in each state of sleep, how long 
it takes to fall asleep (sleep onset latency), how long the person sleeps at night (total sleep 
time), how much time is spent awake during the night (wake-after-sleep-onset), how much 
time is spent in bed, latency to the first REM period, and number of REM periods. All this 
information is used to determine whether or not sleep is normal and if not, what is wrong 
with it (Ancoli-Isreal, 1997). 
The machine that records these functions is called a polygraph. The electrical signals, 
such as the EEG, the EOG, or the EMG, recorded from the person being tested flows 
through cables to the polygraph, where it is amplified (enlarged) and filtered (cleaned of 
unwanted noisy signals). PSG is of vital importance (Ancoli-Isrea1, 1997) in objectively 
identifYing physiological-based sleep disorders. Even though insomnia is a relatively 
common disorder, PSG evaluations are not recommended in all cases of sleep disturbance 
because they are expensive and would be impractical (Spielman, 1986). 
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The MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 1989),. sometimes used as an indicator of 
insomnia, is, as noted previously, a broadband psychological test designed to assess a 
number of major patterns of personality and emotional disorders. Twelve of thirteen studies 
(Satiea, Doghramji, Hauri, & Morin, 2000) that compare insomniacs with normal sleepers 
demonstrated significantly higher scores on one of more scales of the MMPI The scales 
most commonly elevated in these studies include depression (0), hypochondriasis (Hs), 
hysteria (Hy), and psychasthenia (Pt). These MMPI scales suggest a pattern ofintemalized 
emotion, obsessive rumination, anxiety, depression, and a tendency to somaticize 
psychological conflict (Hauri & Fisher, 1986). In one study (Vgontzas, Kales, Bixler, 
Manfredi, & Vela-Bueno, 1994), it was suggested that MMPI criteria provided better 
discrimination between insomniacs and controls than did PSG criteria. This observation is 
consistent with the concept that psychological variables (reflecting baseline personality traits 
or, possibly, response to the insomnia) define chronic insomnia better than other measures. 
However, demonstration of psychological disturbance on the MMPI does not constitute 
clear evidence that such disturbance is a primary cause of insomnia. The evidence (Sateia et 
al., 2000) more strongly suggested that psychological disturbance and associated 
hyperarousal playa key role in the genesis and maintenance of chronic insomnia. Sateia and 
colleagues suggested that the daytime consequences, which are associated with an insomnia 
complaint, might not be due to sleep deprivation but, instead, to hyperarousal, which gives 
rise to both sleep disturbance and waking complaints. To the extent that this is true, it 
suggests that evaluation and treatment efforts might be most effective if aimed at this 
underlying arousal. The current study investigated hyperarousal as a factor in sleep 
disturbance with the variables of restlessness/agitation and mental overactivity. 
Insomnia 
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Insomnia is defined as a complaint of poor quality, insufficient, or nonrestorative sleep 
and encompasses a wide variety of complaints typically reflecting unsatisfactory duratio~ 
efficiency, or quality of sleep (Morin, 1993; Buysse & Reynolds, 1990). Sleep is perceived 
as pathological if sleep onset latency or waking-after-sleep-onset exceeds 30 minutes, for a 
minimum of 3 nights per week. Insomnia can go unrecognized by psychotherapists and 
health care professionals because small numbers of patients report sleep difficulties (pallesen 
et al., 2001) unless directly questioned about quantity or quality of sleep. 
Insomnia is typically described in relation to when and how it disrupts the process of 
sleeping (pallesen et al., 2001). The typical subdivisions of insomnia are as follows: 1) sleep 
onset insomnia-also called sleep onset latency or difficulty falling asleep; 2) sleep 
maintenance insomnia--difficulty getting back to sleep during the night or early in the 
morning; 3) terminal insomnia-inability to return to sleep, even for a short while after 
waking up; and 4) nonrestorative sleep-waking up in the morning feeling unrefreshed. 
These difficulties are not mutually exclusive. Insomnia can be highly variable in pattern or 
can be unremittingly severe. It can be caused by many common and frequently experienced 
life events such as noisy neighbors, stress at work, serious health problems, depression, 
anxiety disorders, chronic illness which causes physical discomfort, and conditioned 
alertness (Rothenberg, 1997). 
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Any insomnia can be worsened or perpetuated by the use of caffeine, nicotine, alcohol, 
and a variety of over-the-counter and prescribed medications. Although it is well 
documented that pain, medical problems, psychiatric illness, as well as alcohol and drug side 
effects adversely affect sleep, the ubiquity of chronic sleep complaints has prompted a 
variety of explanations related to multiple factors (Fichten et aI., 1995). Other proposed 
explanations that adversely affect sleep are: irregular schedules (m some cases, prompted 
by retirement or shift work), napping, early bedtimes, overly long times spent in bed, and 
cognitive factors, such as attributional styles and unrealistic beliefs and expectations about 
sleep. 
Two specific situations must be addressed to further clarifY the definition of insomnia. 
First, there is considerable individual variation in sleep need. Second, a large discrepancy 
may exist between subjective reports and objective findings, such as PSG reports, or 
observations of others (Carskadon, Dement, & Mitier, 1976). Insomnia can be viewed from 
two contrasting perspectives. One the one hand, definitions that rely on PSG data to define 
insomnia is of little use in the routine office-based assessment of the problem (Sateia et aI., 
2000). Conversely, patient reports are often inadequate because there is considerable 
variation in the degree of concern which different patients attach to a given sleep 
disturbance. The practical resolution of this dilemma is to define insomnia as a complaint on 
the part of the patient of poor or unsatisfactory sleep. This complaint may include several 
different aspects such as difficulty initiating sleep, repeated or lengthy awakenings, early 
awakening, inadequate total sleep time, or poor quality of sleep as reflected in daytime 
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function. The definition of insomnia must include a complaint of daytime dysfunction in the 
form of change in alertness, energy, cognitive function, behavior or emotional state 
(American Sleep Disorders Association, 1997). 
Historical information from patients with chronic insomnia suggested that the disorder 
frequently began as a stress-related phenomenon (Hauri & Fisher, 1986). The individual's 
emotional and behavioral response to the condition seems to play an important role in the 
outcome. Heightened levels of anxiety over the sleep disturbance and its consequences, 
negative expectations, and progressively desperate efforts to sleep while spending increased, 
wakeful time in bed are often associated with the development of chronic insomnia. 
Prevalence of Insomnia 
Insomnia is the most commonly reported sleep problem, not only in the United States, 
but also in industrialized nations worldwide (Sateiaet al., 2000). Although the scope of 
insomnia is large, most insomniacs do not seek medical treatment. Physician training in the 
recognition of sleep specific symptoms continues to be minimal (Rosen, Rosekind, 
Rosevear, Cole & Dement, 1993; Sateia et aI., 2000). Therefore the high incidence of 
insomnia complaints, in conjunction with the minimal recognition of the problem by 
healthcare professionals, has led to an underestimation of the tangible consequences of 
chronic insomnia. For example, poor sleep may be associated with a perceived decrease in 
quality of life, an increase in physical complaints as well as economic repercussions, 
including decreased work productivity (Gallup Organization, 1995). There may also be 
dangerous and expensive consequences in the form of occupational and vehicular accidents 
secondary to poor quality sleep (Corfitsen, 1996). Even more sobering is data suggesting 
that decreased sleep time and the use of sleeping pills are associated with increased 
mortality (Kripke et al., 1998). 
Epidemiological studies show the prevalence of insomnia in the general population, 
demonstrating a median prevalence for all insomnia of about 30% to 40% (Fichten et al., 
1995; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), up to a high of 48% (Quera-Salva, Orluc, 
Goldenberg, & Guilleminault, 1991) with a range of l00AJ to 15% being assessed as 
moderate to severe disorders (Gallup Organization, 1995). More stringent studies show 
prevalence somewhat lower (Linjenberg, Almqvist, Hetta, Roos. & Agren, 1989). 
Epidemiological studies of insomnia do not attempt to identifY etiologies of the insomnia 
complaint. Expected frequencies include medical and psychiatric disorders, although no 
clear, causal relationship is proven. However, these studies have suggested increased risk 
for development of new psychiatric disorders subsequent to the onset of the insomnia 
(Sateia et aI., 2000). 
Insomnia in Older Adults 
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Insomnia tends to increase in prevalence over the life cycle. Several age-related factors 
contribute to the increased rate of sleep disturbance in late life, and changes in sleep 
patterns can be strictly part of the normal developmental aging process (Foley, Monjan, 
Simonsick, Wallace, & Blazer, 1995; Ancoli-Isreal & Roth, 1999; Espie, Inglis et al., 2001). 
Estimates of sleep disturbances in older adults seem to range from 25% to 60% (pallesen et 
al., 2001; Morin, Kowatch et al., 1993; Morin, Stone et al., 1993; Bliwise, 1997), although 
prevalence for frequent, severe insomnia is closer to 10% to 15%; and evidence shows that 
such problems can persist relatively unchanged over many years (Espie, Inglis, Harvey, & 
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Tessier, 2000). The higher incidence of health problems, medication use, and primary sleep 
disorders, combined with behavioral factors, such as daytime napping and increased time 
spent in bed, are important factors in complaints of insomnia in the older population. Life 
style changes accompanying retirement may be salient factors in sleep disturbances in the 
older population (Morin, Stone et al., 1993). 
Prevalence of Subjective Insomnia/Sleep State Misperception 
The prevalence of subjective insomnia (SI) is estimated to be about 25% of all 
insomnia patients (Trinder, 1988). If this estimate is correct, the diagnosis and treatment of 
insomnia is complicated by a complaint that is difficult to identify without costly diagnostic 
procedures in specialized facilities. However, the prevalence of SI is difficult to determine 
because relevant studies (1) did not determine whether or not patients recognized that they 
had slept well in the laboratory, (2) did not consider the relations between the number-of~ 
nights data collected and the probability of a patient sleeping adequately, (3) did not 
consider individual differences in sleep requirements, (4) did not identify sleep disturbance 
not reflected in standard sleep measurements, and (5) did not carry out detailed screening 
for psychopathology (Trinder). The argument suggested that there might be insufficient 
evidence to conclude that misconceptions exist in the disorder of sleep state. (SSM). Strong 
debate concerning the validity of this disorder is ongoing. Based on these findings, there 
does not appear to be reason for distinguishing between SSM and objective insomnia in 
ordinary clinical work (pallesen et aI., 2001). 
The terms "sleep state misperception" and "subjective insomnia" (American Sleep 
Disorders Association, 1997; Trinder, 1988) are used when complaints of insomnia or 
excessive sleepiness have no objective evidence of sleep disturbance. The tendency for 
people with persistent insomnia to underestimate total sleep time and overestimate sleep 
onset latency suggests that their perceptions of sleep disturbance may outweigh objective 
findings (Hurwitz et aI., 1998; Woodward, Bliwise, Friedman, & Gusman, 1996a). This 
phenomenon is typical of the S1 complaint known as SSM and appears be common in 
clinical samples (American Sleep Disorders Association, 1997; Engdahl et aI., 2000; 
Aldrich, 1995). However, debate exists about whether or not this disorder represents a 
distinct entity or is simply an exaggerated form of the well-documented tendency for 
insomnia patients to overestimate the degree of sleep disturbance (Reynolds, Kupfer, 
Buysse, Coble, & Yeager, 1991). 
Patients with SSM were those whose polygraphic sleep efficiency (sleep time/total 
recording time x 100) was greater than 80% and whose subjective reports of sleep latency 
and total sleep differed by at least 20% from their polygraphic counterparts (Mendelson, 
1995). Research tended to show that while subjects with PTSD rated their sleep quality as 
poor, their estimates oftotal sleep time were lower than their objective sleep measures 
would indicate (Engdahl et aI., 2000). 
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Recent data (Bonnet & Arand, 1997) suggested that SSM might represent a 
transitional state between normal sleep and objective insomnia. Despite the absence of 
objective sleep disturbance, these patients demonstrated psychological profiles and daytime 
performance similar to those of objective insomniacs. This finding suggested that complaints 
of insomnia and its daytime consequences are not driven solely by objective demonstrable 
abnormalities in sleep latency, efficiency, total sleep time, or architecture. These complaints 
may also be fueled by more subtle changes in sleep continuity or EEG frequency, or by the 
effects of hyperarousal or psychological state on perception of sleep and daytime 
functioning. Such complaints require consideration even in the absence of objective PSG 
abnormalities (Sateia et aI., 2000). 
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Several studies have investigated discrepancies between reported and recorded sleep 
(Coates et aI., 1983; Webb, 1976) and have concluded that sleep-related subjective 
experiences, especially during sleep onset are not well understood. Conclusions suggested 
that subjects almost always report being awake when awakened during Stage 1, and about 
half of the time when awakened during the first onset of Stage 2; however, less is known 
about the variables influencing the discrepancy between subjective and physiological sleep 
and the reasons that some subjects report sleep while others report being awake during the 
same EEG-defined stage of sleep (Coates et at, 1982). It has also been reported that 
insomniacs tend to overestimate sleep onset latency and thus underestimate total sleep time. 
Investigation into variable differences between recorded and reported sleep indicated that 
discrepancies do not represent a tendency for insomniacs to exaggerate sleep difficulty 
(Coates et at, 1983), but discrepant reports occurred only at sleep onset and spontaneous 
arousals, and not at probes taken during Stage 2 and REM sleep. There will always be great 
variability in the sleep of insomniacs. A few days of sleep registration in a sleep laboratory 
will not necessarily generate a representative picture of the accurate sleep pattern of the 
patient (Trinder, 1988). 
Regardless of PSG findings that show no sleep disturbance in combat veterans with 
PTSD (Engdahl et al., 2000), they continue to complain of unsatisfactory sleep. Similar 
phenomena were observed (Lichstein & Johnson, 1991; Fichten et at, 1995; Reidel & 
Lichstein, 1998) in older sleepers (59 years and older). The subjects with and without 
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insomnia complaints did not differ significantly on objectively measured variables such as 
awake time during the night and total sleep time, but the non-complaining sleepers judged 
their sleep to be of higher quality. It is possible that the same concept of sleep satisfaction 
that applies to studies with older adults applies to older veterans with PTSD because of the 
similar chronological age. Participants who rated their sleep as good or excellent averaged 
nearly an hour of deep sleep (Stages 3 and 4) and only 26 minutes of light (Stage 1) sleep. 
Participants who rated their sleep as poor or very poor averaged about 24 minutes of deep 
sleep and 46 minutes of light sleep. Similarly, Fichten et aI. (1995) found varying levels of 
distress regarding sleep in an older sample of poor sleepers. The high distress and low 
distress groups showed similar quantitative sleep characteristics, but the two groups 
differed markedly in their subjective evaluations of sleep. Such studies emphasize the 
importance of subjective perception in older adults' insomnia complaints. 
Reidel and Lichstein (1998) explored the relationship between objective sleep measures 
and subjective sleep satisfaction in a sample of 47 older adults (59 years and older) with 
primary insomnia. Participants submitted to all.night sleep evaluations for two nights. After 
each night, participants provided subjective sleep-satisfaction ratings. Depth of sleep 
(decreased Stage 1 and increased Stages 3 and 4 sleep) and sleep latency were the best 
predictors of subjective sleep satisfaction. However, the correlation between deep sleep and 
satisfaction does not prove that deep sleep causes greater satisfaction. The tendency for 
deep sleep to decrease with age could partially explain the increase in sleep complaints 
among older adults. Sleep latency also distinguished those who were and those who were 
not satisfied with their sleep. Shorter latencies predicted greater satisfaction. 
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Additional research (Lichstein & Johnson, 1991) with older adults with and without 
insomnia complaints did not differ significantly on objectively measured variables such as 
time awake during the night and total sleep time, but the non·complaining sleepers judged 
their sleep to be of higher quality. Previous studies have not identified which sleep 
characteristics are most likely to prompt dissatisfaction with sleep among older adults who 
have sleep complaints. 
Several characteristics are shared in patients with objective insomnia and SSM, namely, 
elevated MMPI profiles and increased metabolic rate (Bonnet & Arand, 1997). It is also 
possible and even suggested that SSM may be a precursor to objective insomnia. There is 
very little data on the long-term natural history of patients with SI or SSM. Therefore, the 
course of SSM is considered unknown but possibly long-lasting. 
Primary and Secondary Insomnia 
Psychological treatment of insomnia has typically focused on psychophysiological 
insomnia, the formal name given to primary insomnia (PI). Primary insomnia has a 
psychological origin, and typical causes are subclinical worry, blue mood, and/or 
conditioned arousal to the bedroom setting (Lichstein, Wilson, & Johnson, 2000). Excluded 
by the definition of PI are individuals whose sleep disturbance is caused by a psychiatric or 
medical condition. In the case of psychiatric disorders, the psychological disturbance is 
more severe and chronic than in primary insomnia, meriting recognition as a clinically 
significant condition typified by anxiety or depression. 
Secondary insomnia, the sleep disturbance caused by a psychiatric or medical disorder, 
is considered a symptom rather than a disorder in itself To qualifY as secondary insomnia, 
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the psychiatric or medical condition must be responsible for causing the insomnia. Sleep 
disturbances in psychiatric patients are often designated as "psychiatric insomnia," which 
implies that the insomnia is secondary to the psychiatric distress (Krakow et al., 2000; 
Nowell et al., 1997). Examples of psychiatric conditions that include secondary insomnia as 
a symptom are major depressive, mania, PTSD, and generalized anxiety disorder (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Although it is not uncommon for insomnia to be instigated 
by another disorder, over time the insomnia may become self-sustaining. 
Perpetuating factors, not present at the time insomnia originates, such as anxiety 
associated with sleeplessness and daytime deficits, exacerbate and sustain the insomnia. 
These factors also promote the independence of the insomnia from its original cause. 
Furthermore, the insomnia may reciprocate and aggravate the primary disorder (Lichstein, 
et al., 2000). The diagnostic criteria for insomnia which is related to another mental 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) is a predominant complaint of difficulty 
initiating, maintaining sleep or of experiencing nonrestorative sleep for at least one month. 
This complaint must be associated with daytime fatigue or impaired daytime functions. The 
sleep disturbance, or daytime sequelae, causes clinically significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupationa~ or other important areas of functioning. The insomnia is judged to be 
related to another Axis I or Axis II disorder (in the case of this study-PTSD) but is 
sufficiently severe to warrant independent clinical attention. The disturbance is not better 
accounted for by another sleep disorder, such as obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) or periodic 
leg movement (pLM), and the disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a 
substance (drug of abuse or medication) or a general medical condition. Organic 
disturbances such as pain syndromes, hyperthyroidism, allergies, cerebrovascular and other 
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diseases also constitute symptoms of insomnia (pallesen et al., 2001; Wooten, 1994). 
Most of the sleep complaints of combat veterans are considered related to PTSD itself, 
rather than to physiological sleep disorders such as PLM or OSA. However some 
preliminary research showed that a high percentage of veterans in sleep studies met criteria 
for PLM (Brown & Boudewyns, 1996.) More exploration is needed to detennine whether 
or not leg movements are more prevalent in combat veterans than others. It is conceivable 
that these movements may represent a neurological effect of combat trauma (Nutt, 2000). 
An emerging hypothesis is that other sleep disorders such as sleep-disordered breathing and 
sleep movement disorders are common in patients with PTSD (Krakow, Germain, et aI., 
2000; Krakow, Melendrez et at, 2001). 
Although secondary insomnia more common than primary insomnia, it has received 
very little attention because it is considered resistant to treatment (Mendel sen & Jain, 1995; 
Mendelson, Thompson, & Franko, 1996) or untreatable as long as the primary condition 
persists. This assumption has strongly characterized research (Lichstein et aI., 2000; 
Lichstein, Durrence, Riedel, & Bayen, 2001), but it is less clear that clinicians have been 
averse to offering insomnia treatment to individuals with secondary insomnia. Mounting 
evidence (Lichstein et al., 2000; Lichstein et aI., 2001) has suggested that secondary 
insomnia is, indeed, responsive to direct insomnia intervention. 
Prevalence of Secondary Insomnia 
Although it is difficult to estimate the prevalence of secondary insomnia, it is not an 
uncommon disorder. A large epidemiological survey of older adults showed that both 
mental health and physical health complaints were strongly associated with the presence of 
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insomnia, though no attempt was made to distinguish between comorbidity and a causal 
path supporting the diagnosis of secondary insomnia. It has been estimated that 
approximately 60% of people with insomnia have secondary insomnia (Foley et al., 1995; 
Lichstein et al., 2000); the worst daytime functioning is associated with secondary insomnia 
in comparison with primary insomnia. People with secondary insomnia experienced lower 
quality of life compared with healthy sleepers and people with primary insomnia. Therefore, 
it is of no surprise that sleep disturbance is intimately linked with psychological distress. In 
addition, insomnia may represent an economic burden for society and employers in the form 
of absenteeism, reduced productivity, and medical costs (pallesen et ai., 2001). Patients 
typically report that sleep disturbances often associate with daytime fatigue, poor 
concentration, irritability, drug and alcohol abuse, violence, suicide, and increased motor 
vehicle accidents (Hurwitz et aI., 1998; Blake & Hurtado Gomez, 1998). 
Pharmacological Treatment for Insomnia 
Since insomnia has many causes, its etiology predetermines the choice of treatment. 
Pharmacotherapy is a treatment choice for people with transient and intermittent insomnia. 
For example, in the case of chronic insomnia related to psychiatric complaints such as 
depression, tricyclic antidepressants with sedative properties are useful (Langer et at., 
1999). The duration of insomnia is also considered an important guideline for its evaluation 
and treatment. It has been suggested (Langer et al.) that hypnotics should be reserved for 
the treatment of transient and short-term insomnia as well as for the temporary and 
intermittent relief of chronic insomnia. However, most clinicians believe there is a limited 
role for chronic hypnotic use but the precise nature of the role has not been defined. 
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In the current treatment of insomnia, benzodiazepines have largely replaced 
barbiturates. Benzodiazepines have become the drug of choice because of their low toxicity 
and clinical efficacy (World Health Organization, 1996). The hypnotic action of 
benzodiazepines is effected via modulatory (benzodiazepine or omega) sites present on 
most gammaaminobutyric acid (GABA) receptors. In contrast to barbiturates, which can 
activate the GABAA reactor gated chloride channe~ benzodiazepines facilitate GABAA 
receptor-mediated transmission only in the presence of GAB A itself (Langer et ai., 1999). 
This may explain their greater safety as compared with barbiturates, which may produce a 
profound and sometimes fatal depression of the central nervous system functions when 
taken at high doses. Benzodiazepines are sedative hypnotic agents whose characteristics 
include safety, rapid onset of action, rapid absorption, and adequate duration of action. In 
spite of the fact that benzodiazepines have represented a major therapeutic advance, there is 
concern among clinicians about their undesirable side effects. Also of concern is dependency 
that may be induced in some individuals by these drugs. The overwhelming epidemiological 
and laboratory data indicate there is minimum dependence on these drugs in the non-drug 
abuse popUlations. Moreover, benzodiazepines alter sleep architecture because they 
decrease slow wave sleep (Stage 3 and 4), and increase sleep spindle activity (Langer et al., 
1999), 
The International Consensus Group (1999) debated the place ofbenzodiazepines in the 
short-term management of acute sleep disturbance. The group indicated that their use 
should be avoided even in this context, and that nonbenzodiazepine hypnotics should be 
used in preference. Similarly, TCAs were inappropriate because they cause daytime 




traffic accidents. In recent years, nonbenzodiazepine hypnotic compounds such as 
imidazopyridine, zolpidem, and zopiclone have been introduced. Clean efficiency for sleep 
induction and maintenance has been observed with both drugs (Langer et al., 1999). 
Zopiclone, in spite of the neuropharmacological profile, which is qualitatively similar to that 
ofbenzodiazepines, has no effect on sleep patterns. 
Drugs acting through a variety of biological mechanisms can decrease vigilance (a 
distressing condition for PTSD patients), and induce sleep. However, all the major hypnotic 
drugs currently in use act through similar mechanisms that involve modulating the action of 
the amino acid neurotransmitter GABA, which is present in relatively large quantities in the 
central nervous system where it is the most important inhibitory neurotransmitter. GABA 
modulates neural excitability, principally through a receptor subtype known as GABAA. 
When GABA or other receptor antagonists bind to the GABAA receptor, C- ion 
conductance through the associated ion channel is increased. 
The phal1l1acological effects of barbiturates and benzodiazepines, including sleep 
induction, are produced by potentiation of GABAergic neural inhibition. However, because 
of the very widespread distribution of GABAergic transmission in the central nervous 
system, it is not surprising that these drugs also produce a variety of other pharmacological 
actions. Much research (Langer et al., 1999; Mendelson, 1995) in recent years has been 
aimed at identifying drugs, which, while acting on similar mechanisms, nevertheless show 
more limited pharmacological profiles. Many physicians prescribe medications that are not 
specifically recommended as hypnotics. Antihistamines, antidepressants, analgesics, and 
antipsychotics are among those recommended. Clinical pharmacology always requires an 
evaluation of the risk~benefit ratio for a given patient. Pharmacological therapy remains the 
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most commonly employed treatment for insomnia among patients seeking a physician's care 
(Mellinger, Balter, & Uhlenhuth, 1985). 
Considering adverse reactions of pharmacological agents as a whole, the frequency of 
reported difficulties is relatively low (Langer et aI., 1999). However the long-acting 
benzodiazepines with a half-life greater than 24 hours can accumulate when the medication 
is taken nightly. Not surprisingly, they have been found to induce daytime sleepiness as well 
as performance decrements (Mendelson, 1995). Tolerance is another consideration with the 
use ofbenzodiazepines. 
Although initial studies (Kales, Kales, Bixler, Schar:f, & Russek, 1965; Leibovitz & 
Sunshine, 1978) suggest rapid development of tolerance to benzodiazepines, later studies 
(Mendelson, 1995; Langer et aI., 1999) have indicated continued efficacy with longer·term 
use. One possible source of such discrepancy is the complex nature of tolerance. Mendelson 
(1995) administered triazolam 0.25 mg. nightly for four weeks to insomniacs and found that 
polygraphic measures of hypnotic efficacy (total sleep time, sleep latency) were improved 
the entire time. In contrast, subjective measures of sleep varied. This raises the possibility 
that tolerance mayor may not be reported, depending on the type of complaint which most 
troubles the patient (e.g., total sleep time, number of awakenings, sleep latency, and/or 
SSM). At this time, guidelines for duration of nightly use of pharmacological agents remain 
uncertain. The notion that hypnotics should be used nightly for only two or three weeks is 
being challenged (Langer et aI., 1999). The major point is that in the assessment of the 
risklbenefit ratio of any hypnotic, consideration should be given not only to benefits of 
sleep, but also to possible adverse consequences on daytime alertness. In general, the new 
hypnotics, such as zolpidem, appear to show no rebound insomnia at recommended levels 
of dosage. 
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Although all benzodiazepines affect cognitive processes, particularly episodic memory, 
the clinical significance ofthese effects remains unclear (Weingartner, Hommer, Lister, 
Thompson, & Wolkowitz, 1992). Assessment is made complex by the high rate of memory 
complaints in unmedicated insomniacs (Balter & Uhlenhuth, 1991) and the transient 
decrease in memory for the few minutes preceding sleep onset (Roth, Roehrs, Vogel, & 
Dement, 1994). The more dramatic forms of memory disturbance (global amnesia) were not 
observed (Mendelson, 1995). 
Recently, melatonin has received tremendous attention in the popular press as a 
potential treatment for a range of medical problems from cancer to insomnia (Langer et aI., 
1999). Although most claims about the efficacy of melatonin for insomnia are entirely 
without scientific foundation (Reppert & Weaver, 1995), the hypnotic properties of 
melatonin have been the focus of a sustained scientific effort. Important issues about the 
physiology of melatonin, its effects on sleep-wake regulation, and its safety in clinical 
application remain unsolved. Consequently, pending resolution of this information, 
recommendations regarding the use of melatonin in the treatment of insomnia are 
premature. 
Polysomnographic Results with PTSD and Insomnia 
Quite surprisingly, recent PSG studies (Hurwitz et aI., 1998; Engdahl et aI., 2000; 
Mellman, Kulick-Bell, Ashlock, & Nolan, 1995; Mellman, 1997; Dow et aI., 1996; Fuller, 
Waters, & Scott, 1994; Kramer & Kinney, 1988; Ross et aI., 1994a; Woodward et aI., 
68 
1996a, 1996b) suggested that sleep efficiency was hardly indicative of sleep disturbance in 
the presence of clinically significant PTSD in patients with typical histories of disrupted 
sleep. When comorbid sleep disorders were not included in the sample, sleep was clinically 
similar to control groups. A possible explanation for this conflicting finding was that 
nightmares are not generally experienced in laboratory settings. This may be attributable to 
patients perceiving the laboratory as a safe environment because the presence of a person 
just outside the participants' sleeping quarters acts as a watch guard and reduces nightmares 
in the veteran population (Woodward, 1995; Woodward et aI., 2000). Such speculation 
could account for a sleep laboratory being perceived by combat veterans as a safe place; 
consequently, patients have reported sleeping better in a laboratory than under normal 
conditions. This phenomenon represents an important obstacle to making nightmare 
observations under "guarded" conditions. Conflicting earlier reports have shown that PSG 
data with PTSD indicated poor sleep efficiency, frequent arousals, and high REM density in 
some; yet others found lengthened REM latency along with shortened REM period duration 
(Brown & Boudewyns, 1996). 
Additional literature on PSG-monitored sleep in patients with PTSD other than 
Vietnam combat veterans indicated inconsistent variability of findings (Hurwitz et aI., 
1998). Perhaps some of these inconsistencies among published findings may relate in part to 
the differing lengths of time since the trauma exposure, small sample sizes, and the presence 
of confounding comorbid psychiatric disorders among participants with PTSD. 
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Internal Vigilance and Sensory Deprivation 
A clinically significant aspect of sleep in chronic PTSD may be related to adaptation 
rather than to hyperarousal. Hurwitz et aI., (1998) found that Vietnam combat veterans with 
self-described sleep disturbance were observed as sleeping more soundly than expected in 
two nights of PSG study. They also had fewer arousals from sleep Stages 3 and 4 than did 
the controls on the second night of the study (Hurwitz et aI., 1998; Engdahl et aI.; 2000). 
Visually scored sleep stages, sleep efficiency, total sleep time, and arousal indices indicated 
rather continuous sleep but did not address the level of vigilance during sleep. The elevation 
of auditory arousal thresholds in affected participants during NREM sleep, as well as REM 
sleep, has been cited as a very important finding (Dagan & Lavie, 1991; Hurwitz et al.; 
1998). It has been suggested these findings indicate that persons suffering from PTSD may 
have a heightened responsiveness to internal events but are less arousable by external stimuli 
(Kramer, 1993). This data may suggest a reason why patients with PTSD will report not 
feeling rested upon awakening. Depth of sleep may represent a chronic adaptation to 
trauma. The common subjective sleep complaint of chronic PTSD may reflect a breakdown 
of this adaptation but with enough resilience to permit intact sleep in a safe, neutral 
environment such as the sleep laboratory (Hurwitz et aI., 1998). This explanation offers at 
least one theory why patients with PTSD show no sleep deficits on PSG, yet chronically 
complain of sleep disturbance. 
Early studies (Coursey, Buchsbaum, & Frankel, 1975) appeared to support the intemal 
vigilance theory. Primary chronic insomniacs were less responsive to external stimulation 
but engaged in more excessive worrying and rumination than did matched controls. Such 
studies may suggest that insomniacs may be less behaviorally and cognitively stimulated 
70 
than nonna! sleepers. Lack of stimulation may be analogous to sensory deprivation and may 
contribute to problems in sleeping and possibly to the increased physiological activation 
characteristic of insomniacs. Insomniacs were more sedentary, spent more time alone in 
solitary activities, and thought about their problems significantly more than matched normal 
controls (Monroe, 1967; Zimmerman, 1967). There is a continuing need for additional 
research to investigate the combination of physiological and psychological variables 
influencing the perception of wakefulness. It is possible that short arousals may be 
occurring throughout the EEG at sleep onset as well as spontaneous arousals to influence 
this perception, but the EEG is scored as sleep because of the "all-or-nothing" approach to 
scoring each epoch (Campbell & Webb, 1981). A more sensitive scoring system may be 
needed to uncover the correlates of perception of wakefulness. 
Corroborating early reports (Orstein, 1969) suggested that during periods of sensory 
isolation, persons underestimate duration of elapsed time. Sensory deprivation has been 
associated with increased total sleep in the early deprivation period but conclusions are less 
clear that sensory isolation is a factor as sleep proceeds through its cycles (potter & Heron, 
1972; Royal, 1976). It has also been hypothesized (De la Pena, 1978) that if the amount of 
sensory flow and activation faUs outside some optimal range over some period oftime, the 
brain increases sensory flow by increasing REM and/or the amount of wakefulness. Thus, 
One way of accounting for discrepancies between reported and recorded elapsed time is by 
hypothesizing that people with insomnia may be in a state analogous to sensory deprivation. 
Increased deprivation would lead to underestimations of elapsed time and to increased 
wakefulness. 
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Sleep fragmentation may be an important factor in insomnia complaints (Walsh & 
Lindblom, 1997) from patients with PTSD. Sleep fragmentation refers to the occurrence of 
multiple brief arousals from sleep, typically without awareness or recollection on the part of 
the sleeper. When brief arousals (2-20 seconds) are frequent, individuals become 
physiologically sleepy during the day despite obtaining what appears to be adequate sleep at 
night. Experimental study (Walsh & Lindblom) has shown that restorative sleep must be 
continuous. Sleep fragmentation can result in performance decrements and physiological 
sleepiness comparable to the effects of total sleep deprivation. 
REMin War Veterans 
Alterations in REM sleep may be another significant aspect of PTSD in war veterans, 
although results were inconsistent. Engdahl and colleagues (2000) discovered that those 
with PTSD had a higher percentage of REM sleep, a finding consistent with other reports 
(van Kammen, Christiansen, & van Kammen, 1990; Hefez, Mm, & Lavie, 1987; Inman, 
Silver, & Doghramj~ 1990; Ross et aI., 1994a, 1994b; Mellman, 1997). However, it would 
seem that such results would also be observable in the general popUlation of men in midlife 
and beyond. Perhaps this finding has provided support for the notion that PTSD involves 
fundamental alterations in REM sleep, reflecting an involvement in memory processing. In 
general, REM sleep amounts were mildly elevated and REM latencies were at the low end 
of the nonpathologic range (Kupfer, Reynolds, Grochocinski, Ulrich, & McEachran, 1986). 
Of the published PSG studies ofPTSD, 14 (six case reports/series and eight case 
control studies), reporting on up to 266 participants, have involved Vietnam combat 
veterans who were studied 15 to 25 years after their combat exposure (Brown & 
r 
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Boudewyns, 1996; Dow et al., 1996; Fuller et al., 1994; Kramer & Kinney, 1988; Kramer, 
Kinney, & Scharf, 1982; Mellman, Ramsay, & Fitzgerald, 1991; Mellman et al., 1995; 
Mellman, 1997; Ross et al., 19948, 1994b; van der Kolk, Blitz, BUff, Sherry, & Hartmann, 
1984; Woodward et al., 19968, 1996b; Woodward, Friedman, & Bliwise, 1996). In two of 
the eight studies reporting REM latency, the value was elevated (Kramer et aI., 1982; 
Kramer & Kinney, 1988), and in one it was decreased (Dow et al., 1996). Without formal 
reporting of all quantitative data, one article describes REM latency less than 40 minutes 
and some sleep-onset REM periods in a number of cases (Greenberg, Pearlman, & Gampel, 
1972). In the three studies reporting REM density, it was increased with borderline 
statistical significance in one (Ross et al., 1994a), increased in one (Mellman, 1997), and 
unremarkable in one (Dow et at, 1996). Sleep architecture was generally unremarkable, 
other than decreased slow-wave sleep in two reports (Fuller et al., 1994; Woodward et al., 
1996a), decreased REM percentage in one (Kramer & Kinney, 1988), and increased REM 
percentage in another (Ross et aI., 1994a). 
Cognitions Related to Sleep 
Of the various psychological contributing factors to insomnia, cognitive beliefs about 
sleep have received little research attention, yet may be instrumental in exacerbating and 
perpetuating sleep disturbances. Increasing evidence (Morin, 1993; Morin, Stone et al., 
1993) suggested that the content and affective valences of pre-sleep cognitive activity are 
important mediating factors in insomnia. Insomniacs endorsed stronger beliefs about the 
negative consequences of insomnia, expressed more helplessness about fear of losing 
control oftheir sleep, and more helplessness about its unpredictability. Sleep researchers 
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(Ross et aI., 1989; Morin, 1993; Morin, Stone et aI., 1993; Krakow et aI., 2001; Ballenger 
et aI., 2000) believe that assessment and treatment aimed at altering dysfunctional beliefs 
and attitudes about sleeplessness may be beneficial in reducing sleep complaints and 
disturbances. The main clinical implication of such research seems to suggest that these 
faulty cognitions should be identified and targeted for alteration in the management of 
insomnia. 
Benjamin Franklin once said, "Early to bed and early to rise, makes a man healthy, 
wealthy, and wise." Such cognitive distortions persevere throughout the ages and 
perpetuate the beliefs about sleep. Five types of dysfunctional beliefs about insomnia have 
been identified (Morin, 1993). They are (1) misconceptions about the cause ofinsomnia, (2) 
misattributions or amplifications of the consequences of poor sleep, (3) unrealistic sleep 
expectations, (4) diminished perceptions of control and predictability of sleep, and (5) faulty 
beliefs about sleep-promotion practices. Such cognitions often consist of worrying and 
ruminating over the consequences of sleep loss, unrealistic expectations regarding sleep 
requirements, and misattribution of daytime impairments to poor sleep. These cognitive 
distortions can trigger emotional arousal and perpetuate into chronic sleep disturbance 
because the irrational beliefs can control current and future sleep behaviors. For example, an 
individual may believe that 8 hours of sleep are necessary to feel refreshed and to function 
well the next day. Iffewer than 8 hours of sleep are obtained, some people might avoid or 
cancel social or work obligations. If a few nights of poor sleep are identified, this may be 
considered a permanent condition, beyond the control of the individual. 
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Cognitive Hyperarousal 
It has been suggested that cognitive hyperarousal can playa central, predisposing role 
in insomnia (Fichten et aI., 1995; Morin, Kowatch et aI., 1993) and is a hypothesis in this 
study. Mental overactivity has been widely implicated in the development and maintenance 
of insomnia; this makes the accurate and valid measurement of cognitive variables important 
(Espie et al., 2000). Investigation has found the importance of cognitive arousal; it is more 
strongly associated with sleep disruption than is physiological arousal. Ample evidence 
(Espie, et al., 2000; Morin, 1993; Morin, Kawatch et al., 1993) supports the theory that 
cognitive factors are central to the complaint of insomnia. Worry about possible external 
danger and worry about internal sleep can become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Spielman, 
Nunes, & Glovinsky, 1996). It was reported (Evans, 1977) over 25 years ago that poor r 
sleepers complain more often of mental alertness in bed than of physiological arousal. 
Mental alertness appears more difficult to control than somatic states. Manipulations aimed 
at increasing cognitive intrusion led to significantly longer latency to sleep onset. 
Conversely, mental processing tasks that disrupt sleep-related cognitions appeared to 
decrease sleep onset time. Cognitive overarousal prior to sleep, particularly anxiety-
provoking or unpleasant thoughts, has been proposed as inhibitory to sleep-onset and has 
been hypothesized as contributing directly to the etiology and maintenance of sleep-onset 
insomnia (Van Egeren et ai., 1983). Indeed most researchers and clinicians now implicate 
negative worrying and intrusive thoughts in the experience and maintenance of sleep 
disorder (Morin, 1993). 
Insomnia secondary to chronic pain was studied (Smith et ai., 2001) to investigate the 
theory that cognitive arousal maintains chronic insomnia. Results supported the premise. 
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showing that cognitive arousal, as opposed to pain and depressive symptom severity, best-
predicted sleep disturbance, indicating, as well, that rumination may be an important feature 
of both primary insomnia and insomnia secondary to chronic pain. The researchers further 
speculated that although cognitive arousal may be a common factor, the content of patients' 
thoughts prior to sleep is likely to differ. For instance, patients with primary insomnia may 
ruminate about not sleeping and the consequences of poor sleep (Watts, Coyle & East, 
1994 ; Van Egeren et al., 1983), but patients with insomnia secondary to pain may ruminate 
about pain or the consequences of their disability. The researchers hypothesized that 
thoughts about pain, the procedure, and negative sleep-related concerns would be among 
the most commonly reported thought contents. This indeed was the case. They also 
expected that the three content areas would not be equally weighted with respect to 
frequency and that general thoughts about pain would clearly predominate. This was not the 
case, as the general ''thoughts about pain" category was only 9% to 10% more frequent 
than thoughts about the procedure and negative sleep-related thoughts, respectively. Thus, 
Smith et at. (2001) convincingly argued that cognitive arousal is a primary feature of 
insomnia and that, regardless of etiology, negative sleep ... related thoughts are common to 
both primary insomnia and insomnia secondary to pain. Study results suggested that for 
both primary insomnia and insomnia secondary to pain sleep continuity problems may be 
related to cognitive arousal and lor increased sensory and information processing. 
Consequently, analgesic therapies alone may not be the optimal strategy for treating 
insomnia in chronic pain patients. Instead, standard cognitive-behavioral treatments for 
insomnia may be quite useful and effective. Relevant comparison group studies, such as the 
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present study, are important to extend the findings of chronic pain patients with insomnia to 
other patient populations with another form of secondary insomnia, such as PTSD. 
Insomnia in pain patients may initially occur in association with acute pain, but may 
persist for reasons that are similar to those that account for chronic sleep disturbance in 
patients with primary insomnia. Findings (Smith et aI., 2001) demonstrated that pre-sleep 
cognitive arousal predicted sleep quality best and that pain severity was not a significant 
predictor. In other words, regardless of the etiology, chronic insomnia may be maintained 
by factors such as cognitive arousal. 
Activities such as rehearsing, planning, and engaging in problem-solving thoughts 
formed the largest component of pre-sleep cognitive activity (Wicklow & Espie, 2000). 
The actigraph , a small, watch-like device that records and stores movement information in 
epochs of one minute or less by means ofan accelerometer-microprocessor link ,was used 
to measure sleep; according to this measurement, about half of aU mental activity was of 
this type, comprising reflection on the day past, preparation for the next day, and 
consideration of personal and work-related matters. What cannot be assumed from this 
research is the percentage of these thoughts that were worrisome to the subjects or whether 
or not they caused delayed sleep. The next most frequent form of mental pre-sleep activity 
was thinking about sleep and its consequences. Subjects reported preoccupation with being 
able to faD asleep and the anticipated impact which poor sleep might have on daytime 




One hundred and eight (108) participants volunteered for the study. Eight Participants 
were removed from the study because they did not meet inclusion and exclusion criteria. Of 
the eight participants, two were removed because they scored less than an item severity of 4 
on the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale; one participant was removed because he had 
minimal combat exposure. Two participants were removed because they were under the 
minimum age of 50, and three participants were removed because they reporting having 
obstructive sleep apnea. One hundred (N = 100) participants who met inclusion and 
exclusion criteria were surveyed between November 2003 and January 2004. 
It was estimated that a sample size of 100 would be adequate to achieve at least a 
~~ium effect size to detect group differences at a power level of .80. To corroborate the 
estimation of 100 participants, a literature review of studies investigating similar variables 
using parametric statistics (Falsetti & Resick, 1995; Espie, Lindsey, Brooks, Hood, & 
Turvey, 1989; Espie et aI., 2001; Engdahl et aI., 2000; Edinger et aI., 2000; Dowet aI., 
1996; & Currie et aI., 2000) used the following number of participants: 120, 70, lO9,59, 
125,41, and 60 (M= 83.4). respectively. Power analysis, a function of sample size, the 
nominal alpha level (a =: .05), and the effect size (Weinfurt, 1995), indicated that the sample 
sizes listed above were large enough to detect moderate group differences. 
The average age of participants was 55.86 (N = 100; SD =: 3.86). Race was identified 
as 83% Caucasian, 12% African American, 3% Hispanic, and 2% identified their race as 
other. Subsequent to the findings of race from this study, a comparison was made to the 
population race of veterans who served in Vietnam. Surprisingly, race percentages of 
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Vietnam veterans were very similar to ones surveyed in this study (Kulka et aI., 1990): 87% 
of veterans from Vietnam were Caucasian; 11% were Black; and 5% were Hispanic. 
Marital status showed that S90AI were married, 27% were divorced, and 6% were 
separated. Four percent (4%) identified marital status as widowed and 4% were never 
married. 
Table 1 contains data on the frequency of participants' sleep trouble. Frequency and 
type of sleep problems are reported. Participants reported a belief that they slept an average 
of 4.42 hours ~D = .97) per night. Almost all participants (96%) did not feel refreshed 
after sleep. The participants were not asked if they experienced sleep problems prior to their 
military service. 
Table 1. Frequency of Sleep Trouble, Type of Sleep Trouble 
Frequency of Sleep Trouble 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 1 =almost every night 58 58.0 
2=1 or 2 times a week 37 95.0 
3=few times a month 5 100.0 
Total N= 100 
Type of Sleep Trouble 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 1 =famng asleep 31 31.0 
2=staying asleep 16 47.0 
3=earIy morning awakening 0 47.0 
4=2 of the above 26 73.0 
5=all of the above 27 100.0 
Total N= 100 
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Sixty-three percent (63%) of participants did not take medications to help them get to 
sleep. Of the participants who took sleep medication, 83% took the medications exactly as 
prescribed by their doctor. More than half of participants (67%) who took medications to 
help them sleep reported that they did not take more medication than prescribed. Thirty-five 
percent (35%) of people who took sleep medicine believed they took less medication than 
prescribed. Participants were not asked to list any medications taken for conditions other 
than sleep. 
Sixty-seven percent (67%) of all participants were veterans of the U.S. Military. The 
veterans who were in the group of men without PTSD were in noncombat roles and 
stationed outside a theater of war. Forty-three percent (43%) of veterans received disability 
compensation through the U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA); 25% of them were 
rated totally disabled. 
Forty-four percent (44%) of all participants reported having a psychiatric diagnosis. 
Some veterans with PTSD reported receiving disability from the VA for PTSD, but did not 
always list PTSD as a psychiatric condition. Table 2 on the following page identifies all 
psychiatric diagnoses, including PTSD when veterans received disability benefits for it. With 
PTSD added to the psychiatric diagnosis list, 50% of all participants reported psychiatric 
diagnoses. Twenty-four percent (24%) of participants reported PTSD without comorbid 
conditions, with 7% containing PTSD and other disorders of depression, anxiety, substance 
abuse, and schizophrenia. When these numbers are combined, 31% of participants in the 
combat veterans' group reported PTSD, either alone or with other disorders. 
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Table 2. Psychiatric Diagnoses 
Psychiatric Diagnoses 
Cumulative 
Dlaanosis Freauencv Percent 
o :::: no diagnosis by doctor 50 50.0 
1:::: PTSD 24 74.0 
2 :::: PTSD, depression 3 77.0 
3:::: PTSD, anxiety 0 77.0 
4 == PTSD, depression, anxiety 1 78.0 
5 :::: depression 6 84.0 
6:::: anxiety 3 87.0 
7 ::: schizophrenia 2 89.0 
8:::: bipolar 3 92.0 
9==ADHD 1 93.0 
10 == adjustment disorder 1 94.0 
11 == PTSD, substance abuse, schizophrenia 1 95.0 
12 :::: PTSD, depreSSion, substance abuse 1 96.0 
13::: PTSD, anxiety, explosive disorder 1 97.0 
14 == substance abuse (remission) 1 98.0 
15:: depression, anxiety, and insomnia 1 99.0 
16 == ADHD, bipolar 1 100.0 
TOTAL JV=;100 
Nineteen percent (1 ~Io) of participants received a disability through a source other than the 
VA. It was possible that participants receive disability monies through the VA as well as 
through another source. 
Fifty-seven percent (57%) of all respondents were employed, 43% were unemployed, 
and 28% were retired. Employment and retirement are not mutually exclusive categories. 
Some participants reported that they considered themselves retired and employed. 
Drug and alcohol use is reported in Table 3. Forty-six percent (46%) of respondents 
had a history of drug and alcohol use; 30% continue to use drugs and alcohol. Thirty-five 
percent (35%) continue to use drugs and alcohol to help them sleep. It is not known why 
35% of participants reported using alcohol and street drugs to help them fall asleep and only 
30% reported the continued use of street drugs and alcohol. It is possible that the wording 
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on the participant data sheet led participants to believe that using street drugs and alcohol to 
help them sleep meant excluding drugs and alcohol from current usage. 




Valid 0=00 54 54.0 
1=yes 46 100.0 
Total N=100 
Current D/A Use 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 0=00 70 70.0 
1=yes 30 100.0 
Total N= 100 
Use D/A to Help Sleep 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent 
Valid O-no 65 65.0 
1=yes 35 100.0 
Total N=100 
Historically, veterans of the U. S. Anned Forces have been cooperative research 
volunteers. Vietnam veterans have been particularly instrumental in investigations that led to 
the development of the diagnosis ofPTSD (Yule, 1999; Yule et at, 1999). The present 
study had similar levels of cooperation from the veterans who served in the Vietnam 
Conflict. 
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A seminar on healthy sleep hygiene habits was offered at no charge following 
completion of data collection, as incentive to participate in this study. The seminar, 
conducted on January 24, 2004, was based on Blake and Hurtado Gomez' (1998) sleep 
hygiene program. Fourteen (14) participants attended the seminar, which suggested that the 
seminar was not the motivation for participating in the study. 
Should a participant have become distressed during data collection, the investigator 
would have immediately removed the participant from the study without penalty, referring 
him to a therapist who was available during data collection. The therapist would have 
comforted the participant until distress was reduced. The upset participant would have been 
encouraged to discuss the reaction with a primary therapist for follow-up treatment. The 
investigator remained available for consultation for all participants for three months 
following data collection in the event there was a delayed and distressing reaction. The 
contact information for consultation after the study was included on the Informed Consent 
Form (Appendix A), and all participants were given a copy. Should it have been necessary, 
a referral would have been made to an appropriate private or community source if the 
participant, the therapist, or the investigator determined the referral was in the best interest 
of the distressed participant. Fortunately, the investigator, the therapist, and the clerical 
support staff observed no distressing reactions during data collection of the combat veterans 
group or the group of men without PTSD. 
Combat veterans with PTSD group. Fifty participant protocols (n = 50) were 
completed for the combat veteran group. Participants were recruited from two veteran 
service organizations: Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), and the Vietnam Veterans of 
America (VV A) in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania area. 
Inclusion criteria for the combat veteran group were (l) aged 50 to 65, (2) the self-
perception of chronic sleep disturbance, (3) males, (4) PTSD diagnosis measuring an item 
severity of 4 or greater on the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS), and (5) 
moderate or greater combat exposure measuring 17 or higher on the Combat Exposure 
Scale (CES). 
It was desired to limit the age span of subjects because sleep patterns tend to change 
throughout the developmental process. Several age-related factors contribute to the 
increased rate of sleep disturbance in late life and are considered normal in the aging 
process (Foley et aI., 1995; Ancoli-Isreal & Roth, 1999; Espie, Inglis et aI., 2001). 
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The CAPS was administered to assess symptom frequency and intensity of the 
symptoms required to meet full diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Persistent symptoms of re-
experiencing and avoiding, along with persistent symptoms of increased arousal, were 
required for inclusion criteria for the combat veterans group. The CAPS scoring rule ofitem 
severity 4 (ISEV4) was used as the diagnostic threshold for PTSD because it is believed 
(Weathers, Ruscio, & Keane, 1999) to be the most appropriate scoring rule for research 
purposes; although the more common scoring rule of item severity 3 (ISEV3) is an 
appropriate scoring rule for routine clinical use, 
The rationale for requiring at least moderate combat exposure was to minimize 
premorbid risk factors that may become less important as the intensity of the stressor 
experience increases (Michenbaum, 1994; Ballenger et al., 2000). Therefore, comparing 
light combat exposure, a score between 1 and 8 measured by the CES (Keane et aI., 1989) 
with heavy combat exposure, a score between 33 and 410n the CES, might have 
confounded the results. 
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Exclusion criteria for the combat veteran group were (1) no perception of sleep 
disturbance; (2) known physiologically based sleep disorder, such as OSA or PLM; (3) 
females; (4) the absence ofPTSD, or a score of less than ISEV4 on the CAPS; and (5) less 
than moderate combat exposure, a score of less than 17 on the CES. 
Military women with PTSD were excluded from this study because of possible gender 
differences in the presentation of sleep disturbance. However, epidemiological studies 
showed that women veterans of the Vietnam War have PTSD rates of approximately 26% 
(Sivak & Swenson, 2000~ Kulka et al., 1990). Research using military women with sleep 
disturbance is warranted, but was beyond the scope of this study. 
Men without PTSD group. Fifty participant protocols (n = 50) were completed for the 
comparison group of men without PTSD. Participants were recruited from sleep 
laboratories and social service agencies in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania area. A newspaper 
advertisement was also placed in the local paper to increase participation. Inclusion criteria 
for the men without PTSD were (1) aged 50 to 65, (2) the self-perception of chronic sleep 
disturbance, and (3) males. 
Exclusion criteria for the comparison group of men without PTSD were (l) no 
perception of sleep disturbance; (2) known physiologically based sleep disorder, such as 
OSA or PLM; (3) females; (4) PTSD; and (5) any combat exposure. 
Overview of the Research Design 
A correlational group design, also called the case-control design, was selected to 
investigate the difference between the combat veteran with PTSD (cases) and the similar-
aged participants who identified sleep disturbance but who did not have PTSD (control 
group). It was inferred that differences between groups might represent a critical facet of 
sleep disturbance in male combat veterans with PTSD. 
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The case-control design appeared appropriate for this study because the intent was to 
investigate factors (attributions and dysfunctional cognitions about sleep) that may playa 
role in chronic sleep disturbance with PTSD. Case-control designs appear particularly useful 
with multiple variables such as those that may influence the phenomena of insomnia and 
PTSD. No variables were manipulated in this study. At this stage of investigation, data 
collection can better identifY patterns of associations as well as describe the nature of 
various characteristics about sleep disturbances (Cone & Foster, 1993). The infonnation 
obtained from this study can subsequently be used to developed content areas for sleep 
treatment programs for combat veterans with PTSD. 
The correlational design was well suited to study conditions that are relatively 
infrequent (Cone & Foster, 1993), such as experiencing combat. The design was feasible 
and efficient in terms of costs and resources. Because case-control designs do not involve 
following samples prospectively, there is not a long delay in answering questions for the 
research. Loss of subjects, a constant concern in longitudinal studies) was not a problem in 
this study because participants were assessed at a single point in time) in one assessment 
period. The cases and the controls were selected on the basis of an outcome that had 
already occurred. 
A special issue with correlational designs pertained primarily to the construct validity 
(Cone & Foster, 1993) of the findings. In order to minimize this concern, the construct of 
PTSD was operationalized for the study group by using an instrument sensitive to assessing 
the frequency and intensity ofPTSD; a measurement to assess the amount of combat 
exposure was also included. 
Forms andMeasures 
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Informed Consent Form. The Informed Consent Form (Appendix A) gave participants 
specific details about the purpose and procedures ofthis study. This form included 
information about the rights of human subjects and the risks involved in participation. 
Contact information about the investigators was included on this form in case of questions 
or concerns before, during, and after the data was collected. The Institutional Review Board 
of Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine approved this study. 
Participant Data Sheet (PDS). The participant data sheet (Appendix B) was 
constructed for this study to collect demographic information about participants. No 
correlational inferences were made from the demographic data collected. 
The PDS asked participants to list the following data: age, race, marital status, 
perception of sleep disturbance, amount of time slept on a regular basis, type of perceived 
insomnia, medication prescribed for sleep, compliance with medication, veteran status, 
disability status, employment/retirement status, drug and alcohol usage, psychiatric 
diagnoses, and physiologically based sleep disorders. 
The Clinician Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-/V (CAPS). The CAPS (Appendix 
C), a structured clinical interview for assessing core and associated symptoms ofPTSD, 
was used to determine the diagnosis ofPTSD (Blake et aI., 1995; Blake et aI., 1998). The 
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CAPS assesses the frequency and intensity of each symptom, using standard prompt 
questions and explicit behavioraUy anchored rating scales. The frequency and intensity of 
each symptom are rated on separate 5-point Likert scales. The CAPS appears to have 
excellent psychometric properties. Test-retest reliability for three different rater pairs ranged 
from.76 to .96 for the three symptom clusters, and .90 to .98 for all items on the Scale. 
Internal consistency was .94. The CAPS total severity score correlated strongly with other 
indices ofPTSD: Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related PTSD, r = .91 (Keane, Caddell, & 
Taylor, 1988) and the PK scale of the MMPI, r = .77 (Keane, Malloy, & Fairbank, 1984). 
The Life Events Checklist (LEC) is contained in the CAPS and was administered only 
to the men without PTSD to determine if significant stressors were experienced that might 
be indicative of PTSD. If significant stressors were noted, participants were queried about 
re-experiencing, avoidant, and arousal symptoms to suggest or to rule out the diagnosis of 
PTSD. It was not necessary to administer the LEC to the combat veteran group because it 
was assumed that being in a combat role in a war zone was a sufficient life stressor to 
proceed with the CAPS. 
After it was determined that the person had been exposed to a traumatic event( s), two 
additional factors must have been present at the time of the traumatic event to satisfY 
Criterion A of a PTSD diagnosis: (1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted 
with an event or event( s) that involved actual or threatened death, or serious injury, or a 
threat to the physical integrity of self or others; and (2) the person's responses involved 
intense fear. helplessness, or horror (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Blake et a1., 
1998). 
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The CAPS is the most widely used instrument in clinical trials with PTSD, and most of 
the clinical evidence on outcome measures in PTSD has been acquired using it (Ballenger et 
aI., 2000). The instrument is a single global scale measuring multiple dimensions, all specific 
to PTSD. The investigator of this study was trained to administer the CAPS by the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs, Employee Education System in cooperation with the VA 
Northwest Network Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Center and the VA 
National Center for PTSD. 
Combat Exposure Scale (CES). Combat exposure, the subjective report of wartime 
stressors experienced by combatants, was measured by the CES (Keene et al., 1989), which 
can be found in Appendix D. Three of the seven items on the Likert-type CES were derived 
from Figley's combat scale (Figley, 1980) and the remaining items were generated through 
consensus by four clinical psychologists, highly experienced in assessment and treatment of 
combat-related PTSD. The CES, a self-report scale measuring combat exposure that would 
meet criteria for use in clinical research, possesses sound psychometric properties that 
include internal stability and test-retest reliability. Results for internal consistency showed a 
mean score of25.57 (SD = 10.12). Coefficient alpha was calculated and yielded a value of 
.85. This high degree of reliability indicates that the items are measuring the same or a very 
similar construct. As a second measure of internal consistency, Keane and colleagues 
computed item-remainder total score correlations. The average correlation was. 75 (range = 
.64 to .83). A principal-components analysis using varimax rotation generated a single 
factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. Because a single factor accounted for a high 
percentage of the variance, the scale seems to measure a single, consistent construct of 
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combat exposure. Test-retest reliability within I-week interval was calculated, r (29) = .97, 
P < .0001. 
The CBS rated the levels of combat exposure from light to heavy. Scores between the 
ranges of 1 to 8 rated combat exposure as light. Scores between the ranges of 17 to 24 
rated combat exposure as moderate. Scores between 25 and 32 were judged as moderate to 
heavy combat; and scores between 33 and 41 were considered heavy combat. This study 
used a cutoff score of 17, insuring that all participants have at least moderate combat 
exposure. 
The Sleep Disturbance Questionnaire (SDQ). The SDQ, developed by Espie et aI. 
(1989) was used in this study to investigate causes of sleep disturbance. The SDQ 
(Appendix E) sought to identifY causes concerning the perceived sources of the sleep 
problems. The SDQ was originally designed to guide the tailoring of cognitive-behavioral 
treatment in a major controlled outcome trial. The SDQ is composed of factors that 
correspond to participants' attributions about the causes of their sleep problem: 1-
restlessness/agitation; ll-mentaI overactivity; m-consequences of insomnia; and IV-
lack of sleep readiness (Espie et aI., 2001). The factor structure of the SDQ was 
investigated by principal components analysis, which yielded the three-factor solution, 
accounting for 68% of total variance. Factor 1, mental anxiety, comprised 7 of the 12 items, 
accounted for the greatest proportion of explained variance. In order to investigate the 
factor structure of the SDQ, the data were factor analyzed via principal components 
analysis and varimax rotation using SPSSX programs. According to Espie, in spite of the 
small sample size, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy yielded a value of 
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0.701, which is greater than the critical value of 0.500. Thus, the correlation matrix was 
acceptable for factor-analytic purposes. Three factors emerged from factor analysis having 
eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1.000 and accounting for more than 10% of variance. 
These factors, together accounting for 68.3% of total variance, were accepted for further 
analysis (Espie~ Brooks, & Lindsey, 1989). The internal consistency of the 12-item SDQ 
was calculated to be 0.67, indicating satisfactory reliability. 
Researchers (Espie et al., 2000) have suggested that the SDQ has a credible scientific 
basis and may be useful in further studies on the cognitive basis of insomnia and its 
treatment. The instrument appeared to have conceptually sensible factor scales that were 
useful to describe both perceptions and causes of sleep problems. 
The New Attributional Style Questionnaire (NASQ). Attributional style was measured 
by the NASQ, an instrument that has gone through many revisions over the last 20 years. 
The evolution of the NASQ is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Investigations about attributional styles (ways people think about themselves and the 
world) are typically assessed with a self-report questionnaire-Attributional Style 
Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982). The ASQ presented respondents with 
hypothetical events for which respondents wrote down a cause and then rated the cause on 
each of the attributional dimensions. Unfortunately, the ASQ was not an ideal instrument. 
The subscales of the ASQ suffered from low reliability (Sweeney et aI., 1986). Evolution 
over the years resulted in varieties of the ASQ that met more stringent measures of 
reliability. Peterson and Villanova (1988) attempted to improve the reliability of the ASQ by 
lengthening it to include 24 bad events. The lengthened version was called the Expanded 
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Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ). As expected, lengthening the ASQ improved the 
reliabilities of individual dimensions. Further refinement resulted in a Short Fonn of the 
Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ-S; Whitley, Ir., 1991). The EASQ-S 
subscales bad substantial correlations with those of the EASQ. similar reliabilities. and 
similar correlations with measures of both depressive symptoms and depressed mood, 
Results indicated that the EASQ could be shortened considerably without substantial loss of 
reliability or loss of convergence with depression. 
A new version of the ASQ was explored (Dykema, Bergbower, Doctora, & Peterson, 
1996) in anticipation of correcting some earlier shortcomings and increasing generalizability 
that would allow wider use. The questionnaire was significantly shortened by deleting 12 of 
the 24 items of Peterson and Villanova's (1988) EASQ. Items were deleted because they 
were relevant only for college students, seemed difficult to imagine, and/or were phrased in 
highly abstract language. 
Descriptions of the bad events that were provided were similarly changed. Of the 12 
items taken from the EASQ, all but one was simplified (Dykema et aI., 1996). The 
anchoring of the rating scales was changed to a metric that clearly implied the bipolar nature 
of the stability and gIobaiity dimensions. The ratings were requested Dot from 1 through 7, 
as in previous versions of the ASQ, but instead from -3 to +3. Results of the Dykema et al., 
study showed that the new ASQ (NASQ) was a satisfactory instrument, with evidence for 
efficiency, reliability, and validity; Reliabilities of the stability and globality dimension 
exceeded those reported for the original ASQ (alpha =.46 and .59, respectively; Peterson et 
aI., 1982.) and approached those reported for the longer EASQ (alphas .85 and .88) 
respectively (peterson & Villanova, 1988). 
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Test-retest reliability was not ascertained on the NASQ, although studies with previous 
ASQ measures showed that the attributional dimensions were relatively stable over several 
months (average rs > .60; Peterson et al., 1982). Explanatory style measured with the 
NASQ was independent of gender and ethnicity, as studies with earlier versions of the ASQ 
have shown. Explanatory style measured with the NASQ correlated with reports of 
depressive symptoms as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) to the same 
extent as explanatory style measured with previous versions of the ASQ (average rs = .30; 
Peterson & Seligman, 1984). The NASQ (Appendix F) allowed more flexible investigations 
of explanatory style, including studies that survey the general population (Dykema et al., 
1996). For statistical and analytical purposes, the investigator transformed the polarity of-3 
to +3 to the original 1 through 7 ratings after participants completed the survey (Table 4). 
The NASQ was chosen for tbis study because it of its generalizability and its 
measurement for assessing attributions for bad events. Experiences of trauma are well 
known for their potential to shatter world assumptions, darken life expectancies, and create 
a feeling of a foreshortened future (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Clinicians (Kronik, Akhmerov, & 
Speckbard, 1999) working with traumatized populations observed substantially distorted 
thoughts and feelings of trauma survivors that life can never return to normal. It has been 
suggested (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001) that bad events have 
greater power than good events, especially when people have experienced trauma. Bad 
events are processed more thoroughly than good events, and bad impressions are quicker to 
form and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones. The relative strength of bad 
events over good has been suggested to be the adaptive response at the broadest level. 
Although the argument for studying bad events is admittedly speculative, it is generally 
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believed that traumatized individuals are more attuned to preventing and rectifying bad 
events than to maximizing good events. 
Table 4. Numeric Transformation of Attributional Styles 
Numeric Transformation 
NASQ Statistical 
Transformation Attributional Style 
locus of Control 
-3 1 External 
-2 2 External 
-1 3 External 
0 4 Neither External or Internal 
1 5 Internal 
2 6 Internal 
3 7 Internal 
UnstablelStable 
-3 1 Unstable 
-2 2 Unstable 
-1 3 Unstable 
0 4 Neither Unstable or Stable 
1 5 Stable 
2 6 Stable 
3 7 Stable 
Specific/Global 
-3 1 Soecific 
-2 2 Soecific 
-1 3 Soecific 
0 4 Neither Soecific or Global 
1 5 Global 
2 6 Global 
3 7 Global 
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Procedures 
The investigator explained the purpose and procedures of the study to interested 
participants. Participants who volunteered for the study and met inclusion and exclusion 
criteria were asked to review carefully the Informed Consent Form. Signature on this form 
denoted that participants understood the purpose of the study and the procedures that were 
required for participation. Participants were informed that their involvement in this study, or 
their choice not to participate, was without penalty. To protect confidentiality, no 
investigative data contained identifiable information. Small groups of participants were used 
for data collection whenever possible. 
The investigator collected all data. For the combat veterans with PTSD, forms and 
measures were administered in the following order: (1) Informed Consent Form, (2) 
Participant Data Sheet, (3) CAPS, (4) CES, (5) SDQ, and (6) NASQ. The total amount of 
time required for data collection for the veterans with PTSD was approximately 70 minutes. 
The order of data collection for the forms and measures for the comparison group of men 
without PTSD were as follows: (1) Informed Consent Form, (2) Participant Data Sheet, (3) 
LEC, (4) SDQ, and (5) NASQ. The total time for all data collection for the comparison 




SPSS 10.0 was used to conduct all analyses. Descriptive statistics were used to 
summarize participant demographic data, the CAPS, the CES, and the LEC. Multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to test the hypotheses. With MANOV A, the 
multiple dependent variables were examined all at once. It was believed that doing separate 
univariate F tests initially on each dependent variable might inflate the probability of a Type 
I Error-rejecting a true null hypothesis. These problems were circumvented when using 
MANOVA (Grimm & Yarnold, 1995), which allowed a simultaneous test across all 
dependent variables. With MANOV A, it was possible to obtain a significant multivariate 
effect even though separate analysis of variances (ANOV As) might indicate that the groups 
did not differ with respect to anyone dependent variable. It was possible with MANOV A to 
produce a linear combination of the dependent measures that maximized separation between 
the combat veteran group and the comparison group. MANOV A also provided a test 
statistic for which a p value for the linear composite was determined. As is common 
practice (Cone & Foster, 1993), when a multivariate effect was found, the investigator 
analyzed the univariate F tests (ANOV As) on each of the dependent variables. 
Multivariate test results. Multivariate test results found significant differences between 
groups as demonstrated by Wilks' lambda, F (7,92) = 1203.7, p<.05. The multivariate tests 
are found in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Multivariate Tests 
Multivariate Testi 
Partial 
Hypothesis Error Eta Noncent Observed 
Effect Value F df df Sig. Squared Parameter Power 
Intercept Piflai's Trace .989 1203.713 7.000 92.00 .000 .989 8425.693 1.000 
Wilks' Lambda .011 1203.7b 7.000 92.00 .000 .989 8425.693 1.000 
Hotelling's b 
Trace 91.584 1203.7 7.000 92.00 .000 .989 8425.693 1.000 
Roy's largest 91.584 1203.7
b 
7.000 92.00 .000 .989 8425.693 1.000 Root 
ptsdcont PiHai's Trace .627 22.065b 7.000 92.00 .000 .627 154.454 1.000 
Wilks' Lambda .373 22.065b 7.000 92.00 .000 .627 154.454 1.000 
HoteUing's b 
Trace 1.679 22.065 7.000 92.00 .000 .627 154.454 1.000 
Roy's Largest b 
Root 1.679 22.065 7.000 92.00 .000 .627 154.454 1.000 
a. Computed using alpha::::: .05 
b. Exact statistic 
c. Oesign: Intercept+ptsdcont 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances, shown in Table 6, revealed that mental 
overactivity and consequences of poor sleep did not demonstrate equality. Many 
statisticians (Grimm & Yamold, 1995) believe that MANOVA is a "robust procedure" and 
perfonns adequately on data regardless of whether the data violated the equality 
assumption. 
Table 6. Levene's Test of Equality of Variances 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variance!; 
F dt1 dt2 81g. 
Restlessl 1.949 1 98 .166 
Mental Overacfivity 4.238 1 98 .042 
Consequences of Poor 10.661 1 98 .002 Sleep 
Lack of Sleep 2.228 1 98 .139 Readiness 
External/Internal Locus 
.567 1 98 .453 of Control 
Unstable/Stable 2.706 1 98 .103 Attributional Style 
Specific/Global 
.203 1 98 .653 Attributional style 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable Is 
equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept+ptsdcont 
To add certainty to the results of this study about group differences, it was decided to 
conduct independent samples I-test (Table 7) for equality of means, equal variances not 
assumed, for mental overactivity and consequences of poor sleep. Results from the I-tests 
demonstrated that, indeed, significant differences existed between groups in mental 
overactivity, 1(96.06) = 4.07, p<.05, two-tailed, and consequences of poor sleep, 
1(86.34) = -7.68, p<.05, two-tailed, when equal variances were not assumed. 
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Table 7. Independent Samples Test 
levene's Test 
For Equallly of 
Varriances t-test for Equaflty of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
SIg. Mean Std.Error 
F Sig. t df (2-tai1ed) Difference Difference lower Upper 
Mental Equal 
OVeraetMty variances 4.236 .042 4.076 98 .000 .6012 .1637 .3424 .9920 
assumed 
Equal 




Of Poor Sleep variances 10.661 .002 ~7.687 98 .000 -1.3400 .1743 -1.6859 -.9941 
Assumed 
Equal 
variances -7.687 66.340 .000 -1.3400 .1743 -1.6865 -,9935 
not 
assumed 
The between-subjects effects conducted on the seven hypotheses produced significant 
differences between groups in the three dependent variables assessing attributional style: (1) 
locus of control (2) stability, and (3) globality. Three of the four dependent variables 
assessing causes of sleep disturbance were significantly different: (1) rest1essnesslagitation, 
(2) mental overactivity, and (3) consequences of poor sleep. As anticipated, no significant 
difference was found in the fourth variable of sleep disturbance, lack of sleep readiness. 
Results of the between-subject effects are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 






Type 1/1 Sum Mean 
.. ... I Variable QtSauares df Sooare 
Restiess/AlJltalion 1.219(b) 1 1.219 
Mental Overactivitv 11.129(<:) 1 11.129 
Conseauences of Poor 44.890(d) 44.890 Sleeo 
lack of SIeeD 5.290(6) 1 5.290 
Ext 13.498(f) 1 1-3.498 
Unstable/stable 33.617{Q) 1 33.617 
Specific/Global 27. 1 27.657 
Restless/A.Qitation 1250.895 1 1250.895 
Mental OveractMtv 1632.160 1 1632.160 
Consequences or Poor 1253.160 1 1253.160 SIeeo 
Look of Sleep 1482.250 1 1482.250 
-
.C s 
Extemallintemal 1766.017 1 1766.017 
Unstable/Stable 2556.111 1 2556.111 
Specific/Global 2403.255 1 2403.255 
RestlesslAlJitatlon 1.219 1 1.219 
Mental OveradMtv 11.129 1 11.129 
ConseQUenCes of Poor 44.890 1 44.890 Sleen 
Lack of SIeeD 5.290 1 5.290 Rmne$S 
External/Internal 13.498 1 13.498 
Unstable/Stable 33.617 1 33.617 
Specific/Global 27.657 1 27.657 
a Computed using alpha:::: .05 
b R Squared::::.044 (Adjusted R Squared:::: .034) 
c R Squared :::: .145 (Adjusted R Squared:::: .136) 
d R Squared:: .376 (Adjusted R Squared = .370) 
e R Squared:::: .034 (Adjusted R Squared:::: .024) 
f R Squared = .098 (Adjusted R Squared:::: .089) 
9 R Squared:::: .350 (Adjusted R Squared = .343) 
























Partial Eta Noncent. Observed 
Sauared Parameter -, 
.044 4.502 .556 
.145 16.616 .981 
.376 59.090 1.000 
.034 3.469 .454 
.098 10.613 .897 
.-350 52.757 1.000 
.259 34.189 1.000 
.979 4620.555 1.000 
.961 2436.954 1.000 
.944 1649.559 ~ .908 971.902 .934 1388.494 
.976 4011.434 1.000 
.968 2970.810 1.000 
.044 4.502 .556 
.145 16.616 .981 
.376 59.090 1.000 
.034 3.469 .454 
.098 10.613 .897 
.-350 52.757 1.000 
.259 34.189 1.000 
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A comparison of means, listed in Table 9, suggested that the combat veterans with PTSD 
group (M = 4.56, SD = 1.21) had an intemallocus ofcontro~ whereas the comparison 
group of men without PTSD had an ex:ternallocus of control (M = 3.83, 
SD = 1.03). The internal locus of control was determined by comparing the mean score of 
the groups with Table 4. All scores in excess of 4.0 were internal. All scores less than 4.0 
were extemal. 
Table 9. Comparison of Means and Standard Deviations 
Comparison of Means and Standard Deviation 
Externatl 
Internal 
PTSO/Control Locus of Unstablel Specificl Rest!e$$nessl Mental Consequences lack of Sleep 
Group Control Stable Global Agitation Overactivity of Poor Sleep Readiness 
1 =PTSO GrouF M~an 4.5698 5.6356 5.4282 3.6472 4.3736 2.8700 3.6200 
N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Std. 
1.2105 .7390 .8823 .5726 .7580 1.0193 1.2919 Deviation 
2=Control Mean 3.8350 4.4760 4.3764 3.4264 3.7064 4.2100 4.0800 
Group N 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Std. 1.0385 .8534 .9162 .4622 .8746 .6932 1.1753 Deviation 
Total Mean 4.2024 5.0558 4.9023 3.5368 4.0400 3.5400 3.8500 
N 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Std. 
1.1813 .9851 1.0393 .5294 .8806 1.0979 1.2503 Deviation 
Further comparison of means suggested that the combat veterans' group had much stronger 
stable and global attributions for bad events and more restlessness/agitation and mental 
overactivity identified as causes of sleep disturbance than the group of men without PTSD. 
The combat veterans with PTSD had significantly less concern about the consequences of 
poor sleep than did the comparison group. 
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Discussion 
Results from the demographic data collected from participants indicated that men who 
identifY sleep disturbance do not feel refreshed upon awakening, an expected result. 
However, considering the pervasiveness ofthis complaint at 96%, it was notable that more 
than half of all participants (63%) did not take medications to help them sleep. Such results 
seem to support the findings by others (Sateia et aI., 2000; Pallesen et aI., 2001) that people 
who identify persistent insomnia, as a rule, do not seek treatment from medical doctors. 
Furthermore, it may be meaningful that 46% of respondents identified a history of drug and 
alcohol use; 35% continue to use street drugs and alcohol to assist in falling sleep. Such 
results might suggest an attempt to self-medicate to induce sleep. 
On the participant data sheet, 44% of respondents initially identified psychiatric 
disorders (Table 2). Six percent (6%) of the combat veterans did not include PTSD, for 
which they receive disability benefits when asked to list psychiatric diagnosis. However, 
when PTSD was added in the analyses, psychiatric diagnoses were reported at the 50 
percentile for all respondents. Such discrepancy might suggest that some veterans do not 
consider PTSD a psychiatric diagnosis. It might also be speculated that the way the question 
was worded might have been confusing, and veterans believed that question implied a 
diagnosis other than PTSD. 
Data from this study identified current marital status. It did not ask participants to 
report how many times they were married, divorced, or separated. Consequently, this data 
might not represent a true reflection of the marital satisfaction of the PTSD participants or 
for the men without PTSD. The literature (Cook, Riggs, Thompson, Coyne, & Sheikh, 
2004) on interpersonal consequences ofPTSD and its effect on intimate relationships 
102 
'\ ~ .. 
clearly indicate impainnent in relationship satisfaction. Further analysis (see Table 10) of 
participants from this study indicated that more combat veterans with PTSD were married 
at the time of this study, fewer were divorced, and fewer separated than the men wi~hout 
PTSD. Past studies (Riggs, Byrne, Weathers, & Litz, 1998) have well documented that 
those with PTSD have higher separation and divorce rates than their non-PTSD 
counterparts. Therefore, the results of marital status from this study must be interpreted 
cautiously. Although it is possible that the marital status of participants with PTSD 
contradicts other studies, it is also possible that PTSD participants had more remarriages 
and divorces 
Table 10. Group Comparison of Marriage, Divorce, and Separation 
Group ComparIson of Marriage, Divorce, and Separation 
Group Married Divorced Separated 
Combat 
veterans with .76 .16 .2 
PTSD 
Men without 
PTSD .42 .38 .10 
Consequently, the marital status results from this study are not meant to imply anything 
other than current marital status of participants. The belief of this author is consistent with 
studies that have shown that people with PTSD and their partners feel emotionally distant 
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and detached from each other (Cook, et aI., 2004), and that the person with PTSD 
preferred to maintain this distance throughout the course of the relationship. With PTSD, 
avoidance and emotional numbness are likely to include reductions in the support available 
from partners who may serve as the primary source of care and support for veterans. 
Emotional numbing appears to be associated with marital distress (Riggs et aI., 1998) and 
may result in higher dissatisfaction with intimate relationships. However, it remains possible 
that marital status and marital satisfaction might be associated with the self-perception of 
sleep disturbance, but analyses of these variables were beyond the scope of this study. 
Results from the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for the DSM-IV (CAPS), the 
measurement used to evaluate the frequency and intensity ofPTSD symptoms, the Combat 
Exposure Scale (CES), the measurement used to rate the amount of combat exposure, and 
the Life Events Checklist, the measurement to assess the amount of traumatic events for the 
participants who did not have PTSD are contained in Table 11. The average item severity 
on the CAPS was elevated (M = 5.06, SD = .828) and well exceeded the cut offscore of 
ISEV 4 for inclusion into the study. The average amount of combat exposure reported on 
the CES was also elevated (M = 23.86, SD = 5.88), indicating that some participants in the 
combat veterans group had higher battle intensity than was required for inclusion in this 
study. The mode of the CAPS (4.20) was closer to the number required for inclusion. The 
mode of the CES (17) was exactly the number required for a moderate amount of combat 
exposure for inclusion. Results from the LEe showed that the men who did not have PTSD 
had one or two traumatic events, amounting to 34% and 32% respectively (M = 1.64, SD = 
1.31), and reported no symptoms indicative ofPTSD. 
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Table 11. Mean, Mode, and Standard Deviation for CAPS, CBS, and LEC 
Mean, Mode, and Standard Deviation for CAPS, CES, and LEC 
Combat 
Clinician Adm Exposure Life Events 
Scale for Scale Checklist 
PTSD (CAPS) (CES) (LECl 
N Valid 50 50 50 
Missing 50 50 50 
Mean 5.0616 23.86 1.64 
Mode 4.20a 17 1 
Std. Deviation .8283 5.88 1.31 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
Attributional Style 
As anticipated, results from this study demonstrated the fact that there were differences 
between combat veterans with PTSD and the men who did not have PTSD in attributional 
style, which is concerned with subjective perceptions of hypothesized future events. It is 
believed that this perceptual control over future events can be an important detenninant of 
adaptive coping strategies (Joseph, 1999). 
Results from this study found that this sample of combat veterans had a pessimistic 
attributional style for bad events that is internal, stable, and global. This finding could 
indicate a vulnerability factor in relation to actual negative events. This study hypothesized 
that the combat veterans with PTSD would have an external locus of control. Surprisingly, 
results found that the PTSD respondents identified an intemallocus of control as originally 
proposed by Weiner (1979, 1985). It was the findings oflater researchers (Mikulincer & 
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Solomon, 1988) that influenced the expectation for an extemallocus of control hypothesis 
for this study. Externality appeared to be a reasonable explanation for the chronicity of 
sleep disturbance in combat veterans with PTSD. In other words, no amount of effort 
would change the self-perception of sleeplessness. 
The internal locus of control identified by this study might have important implications. 
Because veterans with PTSD were found to internalize hypothetical bad events, implications 
oflow self-esteem might be a more significant component ofPTSD than originally thought 
by Mikulincer & Solomon (1988). In general, people with low self-esteem tend to blame 
themselves for problems (peterson & Seligman, 1984; Weiner, 1985), and this appears to be 
what combat veterans do when assessing negative events. Such results might also negate 
the notion that veterans with PTSD deny personal responsibility for problems, because 
denial of responsibility is considered a common denominator of all external attributions. 
Consequently, it is possible that the internal locus of control of combat veterans with 
PTSD might suggest an acceptance of personal responsibility. It might also suggest that 
veterans with PTSD might not be as passive in their therapy or in their expectation for 
recovery to come from the outside. Efficacious treatment ofPTSD, and this may include 
treatment for sleep disturbance, is associated with patients taking responsibility for the 
progress oftherapy (Milgram, 1986). 
However, such findings might have negative implications as well Like depressed 
patients who make internal attributions for bad events, combat veterans with PTSD and 
sleep disturbance might be trapped in the depressive paradox of blaming themselves for bad 
events. It has been speculated by Joseph, Hodgkinson et aI. (1993), and supported by these 
results, that with PTSD, the more internal the causal attribution, the higher is the 
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subsequent levels of depression, anxiety, and intrusive thinking. Some relatively high scores 
on the CAPS (M = 5.06) lend support to heightened distress in the combat veterans. 
Internal attributions are also congruent with avoidant symptoms ofPTSD (ie., detachment 
from others and reduction in involvement with the external world). Considering the high 
association between PTSD and depression, it would have been prudent to include a measure 
of depression in this study. Comparing depression between the combat veterans with PTSD 
and the men without PTSD might have added important data to the finding of internality. 
The attributional vulnerability component of the hopelessness theory of depression 
(Abramson et al., 1989; Abramson et aI., 1978; AIloyet al., 1999), for veterans with PTSD 
is supported from the results ofthis study. Individuals who tend to attribute negative events 
to internal (something about the self), stable (enduring), and global (general) causes are 
hypothesized as being more liable to experience the onset of depression or a worsening of 
depression when confronted with stressors; this is in comparison with individuals who do 
not exhibit this pessimistic attributional style. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the hopelessness theory would be able to account for at least some aspects of sleep 
disturbance with PTSD. The combat veterans' depressive self-schemata might also 
exacerbate depressive symptoms as theorized by Beck (1967) and Reilly-Harrington et aI. 
(1999). 
The intemallexternallocus of control debate with combat veterans remains an 
interesting one,possibly moderated by the amount of exposure to trauma. Prior association 
was found between locus of control and trauma-related distress with soldiers who had 
experienced low-battle intensity (Solomon, Mikulincer, & Benbenishty, 1989), although 
these researchers found no association for those soldiers who experienced high battle 
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intensity. The veterans with PTSD in this study were required to have at least a moderate 
amount of combat exposure as measured by the CES; however, it cannot be determined if 
this amount of combat exposure was similar to the study by Solomon, Mikulincer, and 
Benbenishty that measured high-battle intensity. 
Analyses of the current study indicated that both groups of men with insomnia have 
stable and global attributions; however, the veterans with PTSD rated stable and global 
attributions significantly higher than the men without PTSD. Consequently, it might be 
speculated that these.dimensions are important features of the sleep disturbance with PTSD. 
Veterans with PTSD are considerably more steadfast in their belief that highly aversive 
situations are liable to recur and no response can change the likelihood of this outcome. 
Therefore, the expectation of hopelessness in combat veterans with PTSD with sleep 
disturbance may be more significant than for others with insomnia. 
Evidence from this study suggested that the maladaptive role of self-attributions might 
extend to sleep disturbance with combat veterans. There might also be a circular relation in 
which PTSD and maladaptive attributional styles intensifY each other. Following this 
reasoning, it appears logical that if the original attributional pattern was adaptive, reversal 
of the pattern subsequently may be an appropriate therapeutic approach in facilitating 
improved sleep in combat veterans with PTSD. 
Causes of Sleep Disturbance 
Restlessness/agitation, mental overactivity, and consequences of sleep were found to 
be significantly different between the veterans with PTSD and the men without PTSD. As 
expected, the combat veterans group demonstrated more restlessness and agitation than did 
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the comparison group. Restlessness and agitation comprised elements of perceived 
physiological arousal, comorbid with poor stimulus control. Espie and colleagues (2001) 
suggested that these elements of restlessness and agitation were important features in 
insomnia in the general population of poor sleepers. Results from this study extended 
Espie's theory and suggested that restlessness and agitation in combat veterans with PTSD 
are more prevalent than in the general population of people with insomnia. 
Likewise, mental overactivity or cognitive hyperarousal was found to be significantly 
higher in the PTSD group than in the group of men without PTSD. The mental overactivity 
variable used in this study related to mental alertness, which endorsed beliefs about control 
and performance anxiety. It has been suggested that cognitive hyperarousal plays a central, 
predisposing role in the maintenance of insomnia for all people who suffer from the 
condition (Fichten et al., 1995; Morin, Kowatch et aI., 1993). It was no surprise that the 
combat veterans with PTSD strongly identified cognitive hyperarousal as a cause of sleep 
problems. People with PTSD need to perceive the world as predictable and controllable. 
Some researchers (Espie, et aI., 2000; Morin, 1993; Morin, Kawatch et aI., 1993) have 
suggested that cognitive byperarousal is more strongly associated with sleep disruption than 
physiological arousal. Worry about possible external danger when going to sleep may have 
been good for survival in wartime, but continuing this notion in peacetime might have 
become self-sustaining (Spielman et al., 1996). The findings on mental overactivity are 
consistent with very early reports (Evans, 1977) that poor sleepers complain of mental 
alertness in bed more often than physiological arousal. Mental alertness appears to be more 
difficult to control than somatic states. Conversely, mental processing tasks that disrupt 
sleep-related cognitions (i.e" anxiety-provoking thoughts, intrusive thoughts, or negative 
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worrying) to decrease sleep onset time seem to be essential ingredients of sleep disturbance 
in combat veterans with PTSD. 
It was hypothesized that no difference would be found between groups in 
consequences of poor sleep. Surprisingly, differences were found. Examination ofthe 
responses of the combat veteran group suggested that veterans are much less concerned 
about the consequences of insomnia. The veterans with PTSD reported that they have come 
to accept insomnia, and appear to be less concerned about the negative consequences as a 
result of the lack of sleep. It is also possible the difference between groups could have been 
influenced by the participants' employment status and retirement status. The veterans with 
PTSD reported a lower percentage of employment (52%) and a higher percentage of 
retirement (36%) versus the men without PTSD who reported a higher percent of 
employment (62%) and lower percentage of retirement (20%). Perhaps worrying about the 
consequences of insomnia is less significant when unemployed or retired. The association of 
consequences of poor sleep, employment, and retirement was not part of this study. 
However, a possible association is offered as an explanation about the reasons that the 
veterans with PTSD were not concerned about the consequences of poor sleep. 
Lack of sleep readiness, the last factor studied about causes of sleep disturbance, was 
no different between groups. It seemed reasonable to hypothesize that all people who 
perceive sleep disturbance are probably not going to be tired at bedtime. Such results 
support the literature that improved sleep hygiene habits may improve sleep readiness for all 
people who identuy insomnia. 
In summary, because of the prevalence and chronicity of sleep disturbance in combat 
veterans with PTSD, initiating sleep improvement treatment programs and strategies in 
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routine clinical care may be useful. Results of this study suggested that future treatment 
programs consider including CBT strategies and techniques to restructure the pessimistic 
attributional style of combat veterans. It may also be efficacious to reduce the hopelessness 
and depression typical of people with intemallocus of control, as well as to attend to the 
avoidant symptoms of detachment and reduced involvement with the outside world. 
Programming geared toward reducing physiological arousal, of improving stimulus control, 
of reducing mental anxiety, and of dealing with issues of control may be effective strategies 
for improved sleep in combat veterans with PTSD. 
Limitations of the Study 
The case-control design of this study had limitations. Causal relations could not be 
determined on any of the sleep variables, and it was not known whether or not the outcome 
preceded or was caused by particular characteristics. There were sampling biases in this 
design that may influence the relation among the sleep variables of interest. The veterans 
with PTSD who volunteered for this study were members of veteran service organizations. 
There was no way of knowing if this group is representative of the general population of 
combat veterans with PTSD. Whenever cases are drawn from established organizations, 
volunteers may have special characteristics that make them unrepresentative of the larger 
veteran population. As a result, all findings must be interpreted cautiously. 
It is also possible that the veterans who participated in this study may have distorted 
the direction or the magnitude of sleep disturbance. Secondary gain issues must be 
considered because many of the veterans were disabled and receiving disability 
compensation through the VA. As such, it is also possible that symptom over-endorsement 
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by the combat veterans with PTSD may be related, to some extent, to feelings about the 
Vietnam War. It might also be possible that the veterans with PTSD reported difficulties as 
a way of seeking validation for their military service or for special attention, irrespective of 
real sleep difficulties. 
Research on sleep disturbance always seems to include investigator and participant 
bias; this is the nature of the investigation of sleep disturbance. Neither the investigator nor 
the participants were blind to the conditions ofthe study; consequently, symptom over-
endorsement was possible. All participants may have had expectations that participation in 
the study required them to heavily endorse sleep deficits. There is a well-documented 
tendency for insomnia patients to overestimate the degree of sleep disturbance (Reynolds et 
al., 1991), and the participants ofthis study may have been no exception. 
Many variables were uncontrolled in this study (i.e., medical conditions, comorbid 
psychiatric disorders, drug and alcohol use, over-the-counter medication, diet, and 
prescribed medication). However, such variables are uncontrolled in routine clinical practice 
and results may demonstrate clinical significance. 
The instruments chosen for data collection in this study had limitations. Patients with 
clinically significant depression or PTSD were excluded from previous research which used 
the SDQ. However, use of the SDQ in this study suggested that the snQ appeared to be an 
appropriate measurement to use with combat veterans with PTSD. Despite the large 
number of investigations using the ASQ, virtually all of these studies have used captive 
samples, such as hospitalized patients or college students. The most controversial aspect of 
the NASQ was that it did not ask participants to rate causes along the dimension of 
internality versus externality (Dykema et al., 1996), Previous studies (peterson, 1991) found 
112 
that these ratings are less reliable than those of the stability and globality dimensions. It has 
also been argued that stability and globality have more direct effects on helplessness 
outcomes than does internality (Abramson et aI., 1989). It remains possible that the 
attributional styles identified by the hypothetical bad events used by the NASQ may not 
represent the attributional styles of future real-life bad events. 
Self-report questionnaires were used to collect data and these have limitations because 
they contain a predetenmned set of items and are inherently subjective in nature. Also, self-
report measures are retrospective reports that limit reliability as indices of underlying sleep 
pattern because of sleep state misperception. Aside from the subjectivity of such data 
collection, it is always problematic (Wicklow & Espie, 2000) when collecting information 
on sleep and sleep disturbance because of the multifaceted nature of sleep. 
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Future Studies 
New generations of combat veterans are returning from service in Iraq, Mghanistan, 
Bosnia, and the Global War on Terrorism. Like their predecessors, it is anticipated that they 
will return with sleep problems. It may be helpful to address these sleep problems 
immediately upon deactivation before poor sleep patterns become self-sustaining. 
Conditioned alertness or mental overarousal at bedtime that may have started with military 
trauma may take on a life of its own through repetition, even after the original cause of 
sleep disruption has resolved. Studies on sleep disturbance with younger participants might 
discover data to reverse the pattern of sustained insomnia in the veteran population. 
Investigations replicating this study are needed. Also, investigations comparing combat 
veterans who have experienced low battle intensity with combat veterans who have 
experienced high battle intensity are suggested; these may provide additional data for the 
variability of findings with the internaVexternal debate. Studies that include attributions for 
good and bad events might prove useful to promote further understanding of sleep 
disturbance with PTSD. 
Additional studies that compare marital satisfaction in persons with sleep disturbance 
might provide insight relevant to the study ofinsomnia and PTSD. Because the findings 
from this study indicated that the veterans with PTSD were more often married and less 
often divorced than the comparison group, future studies might gather information on the 
number of remarriages and divorces to reflect marital satisfaction and relationship intimacy 
more accurately. It is also recommended that future studies include depression ratings in 
order to make associations about whether or not hopelessness and depression worsen with 
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additional life stressors. Ratings of depression might also contribute important data for the 
int~mality/extemality debate. 
It would be useful to the field of sleep research and research on PTSD to create 
manualized treatment protocols for secondary insomnia; these should include attributional 
retraining and cognitive restructuring to ameliorate perceived causes of sleep disturbances. 
Outcome trials using CBT approaches for assessing and treating sleep disturbance with 
secondary insomnia are urgently needed. 
Finally, investigative study of women veterans with PTSD and sleep disturbance has 
been largely overlooked in research. The lack of empirical study with women is particularly 
disturbing because the percentage of women in the military is increasing. Military women 
are engaging in increasingly dangerous occupational specialties that might expose them to 
high-risk: conditions for PTSD. Military women with PTSD, as well as civilian women with 
PTSD and sleep disturbance, appear to complain about impaired sleep in ways comparable 
to their male counterparts. 
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Appendix A Infonned Consent Fonn 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
TITLE OF STUDY 
Attributional style and sleep disturbance in combat veterans with PTSD. 
PURPOSE 
The purpose ofthis research is to find out (1) what men believe causes their sleep problems, 
and (2) ifwar veterans have different causes of sleep problems than others. Results of this 
study may provide information to help people sleep better. 
You are being asked to participate in this research because you have identified trouble 




Bruce S. Zahn 
Department of Psychology 
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine 
4190 City Avenue 
Philadelphia, PA 19130 
(215) 871~6498 
Marian Bova 
2417 New York Avenue 
Camp Hill, PA 17011 
(717)4394914 
The infonnation you are being asked to volunteer is part of a research project. Even though 
this research project is to study beliefs about sleep disturbance, no one can say this will help 
you sleep better. 
If you have questions about this research before or during this study, ask Marian Bova or 
call Bruce Zahn, who will be available during the entire study. If you want to know more 
about the background of the investigators or the rights of research subjects, you can call Dr. 
John Simelaro, Chairperson, PCOM Institutional Review Board at (215) 871-6337. 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURES 
You will be asked to fill out several fonus for this research project. The forms will ask you 
to provide information about your background and to review some important events that 
happened in your life. You will be asked about your sleep habits and reasons you believe 
you do not sleep very well. Another form will ask you to decide reasons that bad events 
happen in general. The events on this form will be made-up events, not real ones that 
happened to you. 
All forms can be filled out at one session that will take about an hour of your time. You will 
not need to return to provide additional information. 
Because of your willingness to volunteer for this study, you will be offered a class about 
healthy sleep habits. There is no charge for this class and you may choose not to attend if 
you prefer. Offering this class is our way of showing appreciation to you because you 
volunteered for our study on sleep problems. The date, location, and time of this class will 
be provided to you by the responsible investigator and provided in a convenient location. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
You may not benefit from being in this study. Other people in the future may benefit from 
what the researchers learn from the study, though. It is possible that the results will suggest 
ways to help combat veterans and other people get relief from sleep problems. 
RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
There are no known risks from being in this study. There may be some stress when you 
review your life events and symptoms. 
ALTERNATIVES 
The other choice is to not be in this study. 
PAYMENT 
You will not receive any payment for being in this study. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information that you give as part of this study will be kept strictly confidential. Your 
name or any other personal information will not be used on any of the survey forms. Only 
the investigators, members of the Research Committee, the FDA, and the Institutional 
Review Board of Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine will be able to look at the 
records. If the results of this study are published, no names or identifying numbers will be 
used. 
2 
REASONS YOU MAY BE TAKEN OUT OF THE STUDY WITHOUT YOUR 
CONSENT 
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If physical or mental health conditions occur that would make staying in the study 
uncomfortable or possibly dangerous to you, or if other conditions occur that might damage 
you or your health, Marian Bova or Bruce Zahn might take you out of the study at no cost. 
In addition, the entire study may be stopped if dangerous risks occur in other people. 
If you become upset during the gathering of information, you will be taken out of the study. 
If this occurs, a therapist/psychologist who is located at the site of the study will 
immediately see you. The responsible investigator will be available to you for 3 months after 
the study in case you have a delayed reaction. 
NEW FINDINGS 
If any new infonnation develops that may affect your willingness to participate in this study, 
you will be told about it. 
INJURY 
If you are injured as a result of this research study, you will be provided with immediate 
necessary medical and psychological care. 
If you believe you have suffered injury or illness of any type during the course of this 
research, you should notifY John Simelaro, D.O., PCOM Institutional Review Board at 
(215) 871-6337. A review by a committee will be arranged to determine if your injury or 
illness is a result of your being in this research. You should also contact Dr. Simelaro if you 
think that you have not been told enough about the risks, benefits, or other options, or that 
you are being pressured to stay in this study against your wishes. 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
You may refuse to be in this study. You may choose to leave tbis st]ldy at any time You 
also understand that if you drop out of this study or are taken out without your consent, 
there will be no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. 
Your voluntary agreement to be in this study is with the understanding that you are 
participating without hesitation or any pressure from others. You have been infonned that 




I have had adequate time to read this form and I understand its contents. I have been given 
a copy for my personal records. 
I agree to be in this research study. 
Signature of Subject: 
Date: ----=/~--'/_-- Time: __ ~ __ AMlPM 
Signature of Witness: 
Date: Time: _____ .AMlPM 
Signature of Investigator: 
Date: Time: _____ --.:AMlPM 
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Appendix B. Participant Data Sheet (PDS) 
PARTICIPANT DATA SHEET 
1. Date of Birth ______ _ Age __ 
2. Race 
3. Marital Status: Married Divorced __ Separated __ Widowed __ 
Never Married 
4. Do you have trouble getting a good night's sleep on a regular basis? Yes _ No 
5. How often do you have trouble getting to sleep? (Choose one) 
__ almost every night 
1 or 2 times a week 
--
a few times a month 
--
6. Do you have trouble ... (Choose as many as apply) 
__ falling asleep 
__ staying asleep 
__ unable to ever return to sleep if you wake up early 
7. On the average, about how many hours of sleep do you get a night? __ _ 
8. Do you feel refreshed after sleep? Yes No __ 
9. Do you take medications specifically to help you sleep? Yes __ No __ 
10. If yes, does your doctor prescribe these medications? Yes No 
11. What medication(s) do you take to help you sleep? 
Name of medication Dosage 
12. Do you take your medication exactly as prescribed by your doctor? Yes _ No _ 
13. Do you ever take more medication than prescribed? Yes __ No __ 
14. Do you ever take less medication than prescribed? Yes No 
1 
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15. Are you a veteran ofthe U.S. Anned Forces? Yes __ No __ 
16. If yes, do you receive a disability from the Veterans Administration? Yes _No_ 
What is the disability? _____ ~ __ Percent of Rating ______ _ 
17. Do you have a disability other than through the Veterans Administration? Yes _No_ 
If yes, what is your disability? 
18. Are you employed? Yes __ No __ 
19. Are you retired? Yes __ No __ _ 
20. Were drugs and/or alcohol been a problem for you in the past? Yes __ No __ 
21. Are you currently using street drugs and/or alcohol? Yes ~ No __ 
If yes, what drug and/or kind of alcohol? (list below) 
What quantity do you use? ___________ daily 
__________ weekly 
__________ monthly 
22. Do you ever use street drugs and/or alcohol to specifically help you sleep? Yes _No _ 
23. Have you been diagnosed with any psychiatric disorder? Yes __ No __ 
If yes, what is your diagnosis? 
24. Has a sleep specialist ever diagnosed you with a sleep disorder? Yes __ No ___ 
If yes, what sleep disorder? 
___ obstructive sleep apnea 
___ restless leg syndrome 
__ circadian rhythm disorder 
__ REM sleep disorder 
___ narcolepsy 
__ other (specify) _________________ _ 
Who diagnosed this sleep disorder? 
2 
Appendix C. Clinician Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-IV (CAPS) 
National Center for PTSD 
CLINICIAN~ADMINISTERED PTSD SCALE FOR DSM-IV 
Study: Attributional Style and Causes of Sleep Disturbance in 
Combat Veterans with PTSD 
Dudley D. Blake, Frank W. Weathers, Linda M Nagy, 
Danny O. Kaloupek, Dennis S. Charney, & Terence M. Keane 
National Center for Posttrawnatic Stress Disorder 
Behavioral Science Division Boston VA Medical Center 
Neurosciences Division - West Haven Medical Center 




LIFE EVENTS CHECKLIST 
Listed below are a number of difficult or stressful things that sometimes happen to people. For each event 
check one or more of the boxes to the right to indicate that: (a) it happened to you personally, (b) you 
witnessed it happen to someone else, (c) you learned about it happening to someone close to you, (d) you're 
not sure jf it fits, or (e) it doesn't apply to you. 
Be sure to consider your entire Ufe (growing up as weU as adulthood) as you go through the list of events. 
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Please answer the following questions by checking YES OR NO and then circling one 
number in front of FREQUENCY and one number in front of INTENSITY. 
Criterion A Traumatic events 
A (1) Were the traumatic events you experienced in the military life threatening to you or 
to someone else? YES NO __ 
A (2) Was your reaction to traumatic military events that of intense fear, helplessness, or 
horror? YES NO 
Criterion B The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced: 
1. (B-1) Have you ever had unwanted memories about these event(s)? How much distress 
or discomfort did these memories cause you? ' 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 Never 0 None 
1 Once or twice 1 Mild, minimal distress or disruption of activities 
2 Once or twice a week 2 Moderate, distress clearly present but still 
3 Several times a week manageable 
4 Daily or almost evety day 3 Severe, considerable distress, marked disruption of 
activities 
4 Extreme, incapacitating distress, cannot dismiss 
memories or continue activities 
2. (B-2) Have you ever had unpleasant dreams about these event(s)? How much distress 
or discomfort did these dreams cause you? 
FREOUENCY 
o Never 
1 Once or twice 
2 Once or twice a week 
3 Several times a week 
4 Daily or almost every day 
3 
o None 
I Mild, minimal distress may not have awoken 
2 Moderate, awoke in distress but readily returned to 
sleep. 
3 Severe, considerable distress, difficulty returning to 
sleep 
4 Extreme, incapacitating distress, did not 
return to steen. 
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3. (B-3). Have you ever suddenly acted or felt as if the event(s) were happening again? 
How much did it seem as if the event(s) were happening again? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 Never 0 No reliving 
1 Once or twice 1 Mild, somewhat more realistic than just thinking 
2 Once or twice a week about event 
3 Several times a week 2 Moderate, still very aware of surroundings, 
4 Daily or almost every day daydreaming quality 
3 Severe, (images, sounds, or smells) but retained 
some awareness of surroundings 
4 Extreme, (flashback), no awareness of 
Surroundinl!S. mav be unresoonsive 
4. (B-4) Have you ever gotten emotionally upset when something reminded you of the 
event(s)? How much distress or discomfort did the reminders cause you? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 Never 0 None 
1 Once or twice 1 Mild, minimal distress or disruption of activities 
2 Once or twice a week 2 Moderate, distress clearly present but still 
3 Several times a week manageable, some disruption of activities 
4 Daily or almost every day 3 Severe, considerable distress, marked disruption of 
activities 
4 Extreme, incapacitating distress, unable to 
Continue activities 
5. (B-5) Have you ever had physical reactions when something reminded you of the 
event(s)? How strong were your physical reactions and how long did they last? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 Never 0 No physical reactivity 
1 Once or twice 1 Mild, minimal reactivity 
2 Once or twice a week 2 Moderate, physical reactivity clearly present, may 
3 Several times a week be sustained if exposure continues 
4 Daily or almost every day 3 Severe, marked physical reactivity, sustained 
throughout exposure 
4 Extreme, dramatic physical and sustained arousal 
even after exposure ended 
4 
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Criterion C Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma. 
6. (C-l) Have you ever tried to avoid thoughts, or feelings about the event(s)? How much 
effort did you make to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations? 
FREQUENCY INTENSITY 
0 Never 0 None 
1 Once or twice 1 Mild, minimal effort, little or no disruption of 
2 Once or twice a week activities 
3 Several times a week 2 Moderate, some effort, some disruption of activities 
4 Daily or almost every day 3 Severe, considerable effort, avoids certain activities 
4 Extreme, unable to continue activities 
7. (C-2) Have you ever tried to avoid certain activities, place, or people that reminded you 
of the event(s)? How much effort did you make to avoid these activities, places, or 
people? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 Never 0 None 
1 Once or twice 1 Mild, m:inimal effort, little or no disruption of 
2 Once or twice a week activities 
3 Severnl times a week 2 Modernte, some effort, some disruption of activities 
4 Daily or almost every day 3 Severe, considernble effort, avoids certain activities 
4 Extreme, unable to continue activities 
8. (C-3) Have you had difficulty remembering some important parts of the event(s)? How 
much difficulty did you have recalling important parts of the event(s)? 
FREQUENCY INTENSITY 
0 None, clear memory 0 None 
1 Few aspects not remembered (less than 10%) 1 Mild, minimal difficulty 
2 Some aspects not remembered (approx 20-3(010) 2 Moderate, some difficulty, could recall with effort 
3 Many aspects not remembered (approx 50-60%) 3 Severe, considerable difficulty, even with effort 
4 Most or all aspects not remembered (more than 4 Extreme, completely unable to recall important 
80%) aspects of event 
5 
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9. (C-4) Have you been less interested in activities that you used to enjoy? How strong 
was your loss of interest? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 None 0 No loss of interest 
1 Few activities (less than 10%) 1 Mild, slight loss of interest, probably wonld enjoy 
2 Some activities (approx 20-30%) after starting activities 
3 Many activities (approx 50 .. 60%) 2 Moderate, definite loss of interest, but still has some 
4 M,ost or all activities (more than 80%) enjoyment of activities 
3 Severe, marked loss of interest in activities 
4 Extreme, complete loss of interest, no longer 
participates in any activities 
10. (C-5) Have you felt distant or cut offfrom other people? How strong were your feelings 
of being distant or cut offfrom others? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 None of the time 0 No feelings of detachment or estrangement 
I Very little of the time (less than 10%) 1 Mild, may feel "out of sync" with others 
2 Some of the time (approx 20-30%) 2 Moderate, feelings of detachment, but still feels 
3 Much of the time (approx 50-60%) some interpersonal connection 
4 Most or all of the time (more than 80%) 3 Severe, marked feelings of detachment from most 
people, may feel close to only one or two people 
4 Extreme, feels completely detached from others, not 
close to anyone 
11. (C-6) Have there been times when you felt emotionally numb or had trouble feeling 
love or happiness? How much trouble did you have experiencing these emotions? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 None of the time 0 No reduction of emotional experience 
1 Very little of the time (less than 1(010) 1 Mild, slight reduction of emotional experience 
2 Some of the time (approx 20-3(010) 2 Moderate, definite reduction of emotional 
3 Much of the time (approx 50-6(010) experience, but still able to experience most 
4 Most or all of the time (more than 8(010) emotions 
3 Severe, marked reduction of experience of at least 
two primaty emotions (e.g., love, happiness) 
4 Extreme completely lacking emotional experience 
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12. (C-7) Have there been times when you felt there is no need to plan for the future, that 
somehow your future would be cut short? How strong was this feeling that your future 
will be cut short? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 None of the time 0 No sense of a foreshortened future 
1 Very little of the time (less than 10%) 1 Mild, slight sense of a foreshortened future 
2 Some of the time (approx 20-30%) 2 Moderate, sense of a foreshortened future definitely 
3 Much of the time (approx 50-60%) present, but no specific prediction about longevity 
4 Most or all of the time (more than 80%) 3 Severe, marked sense of a foreshortened future, may 
make specific prediction about longevity 
4 Extreme, overwhelming sense and convinced of 
premature death 
Criterion D Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma). 
13. (D-1) Have you had any problems falling or staying asleep? How much of a problem did 
you have with your sleep? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 Never 0 No sleep problems 
1 Once or twice 1 Mild, slight trouble falling asleep, minimal 
2 Once or twice a week difficulty staying asleep (up to 30 minutes loss of 
3 Several times a week sleep) 
4 Daily or almost every day 2 Moderate, definite sleep disturbance, clear trouble 
falling asleep, or clear difficulty staying asleep (30-
Sleep onset problems Y N 90 minutes loss of sleep) 
3 Severe, much longer time to fall asleep, or marked 
Mid-sleep awakening Y N difficulty staying asleep (90 min to 3 hrs loss of 
sleep) 
Early a.m. awakening Y N 4 Extreme, very long time to fall asleep, or profound 
difficulty staying asleep (more than 3 hrs loss of 
Total # hrs sleep/night sleep) 
Desired # hrs sleep/night 
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14. (D-2) Have there been times when you felt especially irritable or showed strong feelings 
of anger? How strong was your anger? 
FREQUENCY INTENSITY 
0 Never 0 No irritability or anger 
1 Once or twice 1 Mild, minimal irritability, may raise voice when 
2 Once or twice a week angry 
3 Several times a week 2 Moderate, definite irritability or attempts to suppress 
4 Daily or almost every day anger, but can recover quickly 
3 Severe, marked irritability or marked attempts to 
suppress anger, maybe come vernally or physically 
aggressive when angry 
4 Extreme, pervasive anger, or may have episodes of 
nhvsical violence 
15. (D-3) Have you found it difficult to concentrate on what you were doing or on things 
going on around you? How difficult was it for you to concentrate? 
FREQUENCY INTENSITY 
0 No difficulty with concentration 
1 Mild, only slight effort needed to concentrate, little 
0 None of the time or no disruption of activities 
1 Very little of the time (less than 10%) 2 Moderate, definite loss of concentration but could 
2 Some of the time (approx 20-30%) concentrate with effort, some disruption of activities 
3 Much of the time (approx 50-60%) 3 Severe, marked loss of concentration even with 
4 Most or all of the time (more than 8(010) effort, marked disruption of activities 
4 Extreme, complete inability to concentrate, unable to 
engage in activities 
16. (D-4) Have you been especially alert or watchful, even when there was no real need to 
be? How hard did you try to be watchful of things going on around you? 
FREQUENCY INTENSITY 
0 No special alertness or hypervigilance 
1 Mild, minimal alertness or hypervigilance, slight 
0 None of the time heightening of awareness 
1 Very little of the time (less than 10%) 2 Moderate, hypervigilance clearly present, watchful 
2 Some of the time (approx 20-30%) in public (e.g., chooses safe place to sit in a 
3 Much of the time (approx 50-60%) restaurant) 
4 Most or all of the time (more than 80%) 3 Severe, marked hypervigilance, very alert, scans 
environment for danger, exaggerated concern for 
safety of self/family/home 
4 Extreme, excessive efforts to ensure safety consume 




17. (D-S) Have you had any strong startle reactions? How strong were these startle 
reactions? 
FREOUENCY INTENSITY 
0 Never 0 No startle reaction 
1 Once or twice 1 Mild, minimal reaction 
2 Once or twice a week 2 Moderate, definite startle reaction, feels '1umpy" 
3 Several times a week 3 Severe, marked startle reaction, sustained anxiety 
4 Daily or almost every day following initial reaction 
4 Extreme, excessive startle reaction, (e.g., combat 
veteran who "hits the dirt" when startle by a sound 
or sight) 
18. Overall, how much have you been bothered by the PTSD symptoms you listed (e.g., 
social, occupationa~ or other important areas of functioning)? 
o None 
1 Mild, minimal distress 
2 Moderate, distress clearly present but still manageable 
3 Severe, considerable distress 
4 Extreme, incapacitating distress 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix D. Combat Exposure Scale (CES) 
COMBATEXPOSlffiESCALE 
Please circle the number above the answer that best describes your experience. 
1) Did you ever go on combat patrols or bave other very dangerous duty? 
1 2 3 4 5 
No l-:Himes 4-12 times 13-50 times 51+ times 
2) Were you ever under enemy fire? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never < 1 month 1-3 months 4-6 months 7 months or more 
3) Were you ever surrounded by the enemy? 
1 2 3 4 5 
No 1-2 times 3-12 times 13-25 times 26 times or more 
4) What percentage of the men in your unit were killed (KIA), wounded, or missing in 
action (MIA)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
None 1-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76% or more 
5) How often did you fire rounds at the enemy? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never 1-2 times 3-12 times 13-50 times 51 or more 
6) How often did you see someone hit by incoming or outgoing rounds? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never 1-2 times 3-12 times 13-50 times 51 or more 
1) How often were you in danger of being injured or killed (i.e., pinned down, overrun, 
ambushed, near miss, etc.)? 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never 1-2 times 3.;12 times 13-50 times 51 or more 
Keane, T. M., Fairbank, J. A, Caddell, J. M., Zimering, R. T., Taylor K. L., & Mora, C. A (1989) 
Appendix E. Sleep Disturbance Questionnaire (SDQ) 
SLE':EP DISTURBANCE OVESTlONNAIIm 
. On the nights when you don't sleep wen the problem seems to be that: 
(tick one box for each statement 
Never Seldom Sometimes Often 
True True True True 
1. I can't get into a comfortable 
position in bed. ',/ 
2. My mind keeps turning things , 
over. 
3. I can't get my sleep patteminto a 
proper routine, 
4. I get too 'worked up' at not 
sleeping. 
5. 1 find it hard to physically 'let 
go' and re]ax my body. 
6. My thinking takes a long time to 
"unwind", 
7. I don't feel tired enough at 
bedtime. 
S. I try too bard to get to sleep. 
9. My body is fun of tension 
10. I am unable to empty my mind. 
11. I spend, time reading/watching 
TV in bed when I should be 
sleeping. .. 
12. I worry that 1 won't cope 
tomorrow if 1 don't sleep welL 
Whieb one of the above statement$ ~ most relevant to you? 
Are there any other factors associated with your poor sleep pattern? If so, please write 
a short note in this space 





Appendix F. New Attributional Style Questionnaire (NASQ) 
NEW ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dykema, J., Bergbower, K., Doctora, 1., & Peterson, C. (1996). 
What causes things to happen to YOU? 
Please try to imagine yourself in the following situations. If such a situation happened to 
you, what do you think might have caused it? While situations like these may have many 
causes, we want you to choose only one - THE MAIN CAUSE, THAT IS, WHAT 
MADE THE SITUATION HAPPEN TO yOU. 
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Please write the main cause on the line after each situation. Next, answer three questions 
about the cause you provided. First, does the main cause you gave have something to do 
with you, or does it have something to do with other people or circumstances. Second, how 
likely is it that the main cause you have will continue to affect you? Third, is the main cause 
that you gave something that just affects this situation, or does it affect other areas of your 
life? 
To summarize, please: 
1. Read each situation, and vividly imagine it happening to you. 
2. Decide what you feel would be the one main cause for the situation if it happened to 
you. 
3. Write the one main cause in the box provided. 
4. Answer the three questions about the main cause. 
1 
Try to imagine yourself in the following situation .. , 
1 . " you have trouble sleeping. 
Write down the one main cause below: 
Does the cause have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people or 
circumstances (circle one number) 
OTHER PEOPLE OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
I I I 
- 3 -2 -1 o +l +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
WITH YOU 




-3 -2 -1 o +l +2 +3 
WlLLALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 





-3 ·2 ·1 
2 ... you feel sick and tired most of the time. 
Write down the one main cause below: 




Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 




I I I 
-1 o +1 +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
WITH YOU 




-3 -2 ·1 
I I I I 
o +1 +2 +3 
WILL ALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 
Is the cause you gave something that just affects feeling sick and tired, or does it affect other areas of your 
life? (circle one number) 
AFFECTS FEELING 





I I I AFFECTS ALL 
o +1 +2 +3 OTHERAREAS 
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3 '" you have a serious injury. 
W rite down the one main cause below: 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 
OTHER PEOPLE OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
I I 
·3 ·2 -1 o +l +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
WITH YOU 




-3 ·2 ·1 o +l +2 +3 
WILL ALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 




4 ... you can't find a job. 
I I 
·3 -2 
W rite down the one main cause below: 
AFFECTS ALL 
-I o +l +2 +3 OTHER AREAS 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 
OTHER PEOPLE OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
I I I 
·3 -2 -1 o +l +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
WITH YOU 




·3 ·2 -I o +l +2 +3 
WILL ALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 
s the cause you gave something that just affects finding ajob, or does it affect other areas of your life? 
(circle one number) 
ruST AFFECTS 
FINDING A JOB 
I I 






5 ... you can't get the work done that others expect of yon. 
Write down the one main cause below: 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you; or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 




How likely is the cause you gave will continue to affect you? (circle one number) 
WILL NEVER 
AFFECT YOU -3 -2 -1 o +l +2 +3 
WILL ALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 
Is the cause you gave something that just affects getting work done that others expect of you, or does it 
affect other areas of your life? (circle oue number) 
JUST AFFECTS 
GETI1NG WORK DONE 
6 ... you are fired from your job. 
W rite down the one main cause below: 
AFFECTS ALL 
OTHER AREAS 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 
OTHER PEOPLE OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
I I I 
.3 ·2 ·1 
I I 
o +1 +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
WITH YOU 
How likely is the cause you gave will continue to affect you? (circle one number) 
WILL NEVER 
AFFECT YOU ·3 -2 -1 o +1 +2 +3 
WILL ALWAYS 
AFFECT YoU 
Is the cause you gave something that just affects getting fired from your job, or does it affect other areas of 
your life? (circle one number) 
JUST AFFECTS 





7 ... you don't help a friend who has a problem. 
Write down the one main cause below: 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 




How likely is the cause you gave will continue to affect you? (circle one number) 
WlLLNEVER 
AFFECT YOU -3 .2. ·1 
I I I 
o +1 +2. +3 
Wll.LALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 
Is the cause you gave something that just affects helping a friend who has a problem. or does it affect other 
areas of your life? (circle one number) 
ruST AFFECTS 
HELPING FRIEND -3 -2 
8 ... you have financial problems. 
W rite down the one main cause below: 
-1 o +1 +2 +3 
AFFECTS ALL 
OTHER AREAS 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 
OTHER PEOPLE OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
I I I 
-3 -2 -1 
I I 
o +1 +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
WIT1IYOU 
How likely is the cause you gave will continue to affect you? (circle one number) 
WlLLNEVER 
AFFECT YOU -3 -2 -1 o +1 +2. +3 
WlLLALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 
Is the cause you gave something that just affects your financial problems, or does it affect other areas of your 
life? (circle one number) 
ruST AFFECTS 





9 ... you don't understand what your boss wants you to do. 
W rite down the one main cause below: 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 
OTHER PEOPLE OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
I I I 
-3 ·2 ·1 
I I 
o +l +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
WITH YOU 
How likely is the cause you gave will continue to affect you? (circle one number) 
WILL NEVER 
AFFECT YOU 
I I I 
-3 -2 -1 o +1 +2 +3 
WILL ALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 
Is the cause you gave something that just affects understanding what your boss wants you to do, or does it 
affect other areas of your life? (circle one number) 
JUST AFFECTS 
UNDERSTANDING 
I I I 
-3 -2 -1 
10 ... a friend is very angry with you. 
W rite down the one main cause below: 
I ! 
o +l +2 +3 
AFFECTS ALL 
OTHER AREAS 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or cirCUIIlStances? (circle one number) 
OTHER PEOPLE OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
I I I 
-3 -2 -1 
I I 
o +1 +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
WITH yOU 
How likely is the cause you gave will continue to affect you? (circle one number) 
WILL NEVER 
AFFECT YOU 
I I I 
-3 -2 ·1 o +l +2 +3 
WILL ALWAYS 
AFFECT yOU 
Is the cause you gave something that just affects you friend being angry with you, or does it affect other 
areas of your life? (circle one number) 
JUST AFFECTS 
FRIEND'S ANGER 
I I I 





11 ... you are guilty of breaking the law. 
W rite down the one main cause below: 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 
OTHER PEOPLE OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES ·3 -2 -I o +1 +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
WrrnyOU 
How likely is the cause you gave will continue to affect you? (circle one number) 
WILL NEVER 
AFFECT YOU 
I I I 
-3 -2 -I 
I I 
o +1 +2 +3 
WILL ALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 
Is the cause you gave something that jnst a:tl'ects you breaking the law, or does it affect other areas of your 
life? (circle one number) 
JUST AFFECTS 
BREAKING THE LAW -3 ·2 -I o +l +2 +3 
12 ... you have a serions argument with someone in your fiunily. 
W rite down the one main cause below: 
AFFECTS ALL 
OTHER AREAS 
Does the cause you gave have something to do with you, or does it have something to do with other people 
or circumstances? (circle one number) 
OTHER PEOPLE OR 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
I I 1 
.3 -2 ·1 o +l +2 +3 
COMPLETELY 
wrrnYOU 
How likely is the cause you gave will continue to affect you? (circle one number) 
WILL NEVER 
AFFECT YOU 
1 I I 
-3 -2 -I o +l +2 +3 
WILL ALWAYS 
AFFECT YOU 
Is the cause you gave something that just affects the argument with someone in your family, or does it affect 
other areas of your life? (circle one number) 
JUST AFFECTS ARGUMENT 1-1 _-4-1 --lI--+I--+--+-...-..4 
WITH FAMILY MEMBER ·3 ·2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 
7 
AFFECTS ALL 
OTHER AREAS 
